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Abstract
We examine the ne microstructure of commuting in a game-theoretic
setting with a continuum of commuters. Commuters home and work
locations can be heterogeneous. A commuter transport network is ex-
ogenous. Tra¢c speed is determined by link capacity and by local
congestion at a time and place along a link, where local congestion at
a time and place is endogenous. The model can be reinterpreted to
apply to congestion on the internet. We nd su¢cient conditions for
existence of equilibrium, that multiple equilibria are ubiquitous, and
that the welfare properties of morning and evening commute equilibria
di¤er on a generalization of a directed tree.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Commuting is a ubiquitous feature of the urban economy. Although the clas-
sic literature has answered some basic questions in the eld, such as whether
equilibrium commuting patterns are generally e¢cient, surprisingly some very
important questions remain open. Can tra¢c be improved simply by equilib-
rium selection rather than through congestion pricing? In contrast with most
of the literature, our model says that multiple equilibria are to be expected, so
this question has content. Do models without an explicit time clock give us
an accurate picture of tra¢c, in the sense that they can approximate behavior
in a truly dynamic model? Schrank et al (2019, p. 7, Exhibit 6) give evidence
that tra¢c delays vary greatly by time, whereas Malone et al (2017, Figure
7(a)) give analogous evidence for the internet. Finally, if travel delay depends
on endogenous local congestion rather than exogenous bottlenecks, what does
equilibrium look like?
There is an important application of our model to tra¢c and congestion on
the internet. Instead of cars, packets of information move over the network,
each with a given origin and destination. Both positive and normative ques-
tions concerning route choice and departure time can be addressed with our
model.1 Interestingly, both the car and internet congestion literatures began
with discrete models (at di¤erent times), and eventually moved to continuous
ow models for tractability reasons. Congestion on the internet can be viewed
as either packet loss or delay.
The economic models employed in the commuting literature are often very
special and unrealistic; a literature review will be provided in the next subsec-
tion. One class of models features identical commuters, a very simple network
structure (for example a home, a workplace and one link between them), and
an exogenous bottleneck that results in queuing of tra¢c. It is not known to
what degree the results derived in the literature rely on these or other strong
simplifying assumptions that generally provide a reduced form viewpoint. In
contrast, we study a new class of more natural models that allows arbitrary
heterogeneity in both commuters and network structure (for example allowing
cross-commuting), where congestion is endogenous and tra¢c slows in response
1In general, one user will send out many packets. However, if these represent a negligible
proportion of the total number of packets, coordination of the strategy choices for these
packets is the same as no coordination for our purposes.
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to congestion relative to road capacity. In the last subsection of the introduc-
tion, we will provide simple examples that display the contrast between the
existing literature and our class of models.
There are important di¤erences in implications between our framework and
the existing literature, mainly due to the detailing of ne microstructure in our
work. What we mean by ne microstructure is not only a game where both
route and departure time are strategic choices of players, but also that time-
dependent events, such as cars catching up with others and slowing down, can
happen in the course of traversing a link. The reduced forms, such as an
exogenous congestion function (that gives delay time as a function of tra¢c),
used elsewhere are generally not supported by this microstructure, leading
to di¤erent results. Our model employs a microfounded, evolving congestion
concept that is suggested by the transportation engineering literature. Thus,
the conditions su¢cient for existence of equilibrium are markedly di¤erent.
As we shall see in the examples, it is quite natural to have multiple equilibria
in our framework, whereas the goal of the existing literature is often to prove
that equilibrium is unique. Finally, as we shall illustrate, equilibria in our
framework are qualitatively very di¤erent from those derived in the rest of the
literature, mainly due to the ne microstructure.
1.2 Five Related Literatures
Before proceeding to our examples and analysis, we discuss the basic literature
on congestion. We divide this literature into 5 components: the transporta-
tion economics literature, the game-theoretic literature on congestion exter-
nalities, the transportation engineering literature, the mathematics of conser-
vation laws, and the electrical engineering literature on internet congestion.2
We discuss these in turn. Our work is at the junction of all of these literatures.
In contrast with our work, the rst two literatures tend not to study dynamic
micro behavior along roads. The second two literatures take individual be-
havior as xed, so the models are mechanical. The last literature tends not
to examine Nash equilibrium, but rather other positive or normative ideas.
The older literature on transportation economics deals with models with no
time clock or with just one route or bottleneck where tra¢c queues. Beckmann
et al. (1956) provide a model of rush hour where tra¢c ows are constant.
They analyze optimum and equilibrium in a stylized model with no explicit
2These literatures tend not to cite each other, rendering literature reviews labor-intensive
and occasionally puzzling, due to terminological di¤erences.
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time clock, but with a representative commuter. Vickrey (1963, 1969)3 pro-
vided the classical analysis of congestion externalities, pricing, and infrastruc-
ture investment. The basic economic problem detailed is that the choice to
commute, of its timing, and of its route by one commuter a¤ects the com-
muting time of others. Although the marginal time cost of one additional
commuter on another is small, when the marginal time cost of an additional
commuter is aggregated across all commuters, the cost of (and optimal toll for)
the externality can be large. Arnott et al. (1993) examine primarily welfare
under various pricing schemes when there is only one route or bottleneck, but
allow elastic trip demand and use continuous time. Tra¢c does not slow down
due to congestion, but rather queues at a bottleneck with limited capacity. In
their conclusions (p. 177), they note: In the context of rush hour tra¢c
congestion, for example, models should be developed which derive hypercon-
gestion (tra¢c-jam situations) from driving behavior, solve for equilibrium on
a congested network, and account for heterogeneity among users... This is
what we attempt.
The contemporary literature on transportation economics uses the termi-
nology dynamic tra¢c assignment problem for the kind of model we shall
construct. Merchant and Nemhauser (1978) initiate the modern literature by
proposing a discrete time model with a single destination node where events
in a link of the transport network at a given time, namely the number of cars
entering the link, the cost of traversing the link as a function of tra¢c, and the
number of cars exiting a link as a function of tra¢c, are all exogenous black
boxes. They provide an example and examine algorithms for nding a social
optimum. Ross and Yinger (2000) embed a model of point congestion similar
to ours in a classic urban monocentric city model with both land consumption
and a symmetric radial road network. This is similar to a simple network with
only one commuting corridor. Tra¢c ow is continuous but not necessarily
smooth. They show that the only equilibrium in a general urban equilibrium
version of a commuting model with continuous departure times and ow con-
gestion but no bottlenecks is an unreasonable one with a never ending rush
hour. As we shall explain below, by allowing a large but nite number of de-
parture times and randomizing departures over small intervals between these
discrete departure times, with some e¤ort we can overcome these di¢culties.
In our context, tra¢c ow might not be continuous. Konishi (2004) considers
existence, uniqueness and e¢ciency of Nash equilibrium primarily in a static
3In the rst of these papers, the automobile is called our rubber-tired sacred cow.
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model but also in a discrete time dynamic model with a simple network, em-
ploying Schmeidlers (1973) theorem4 as we do. He uses bottlenecks whereas
we use speed reductions resulting from congestion. Konishis work is quite
complementary to ours, as we are not concerned with the issues he addresses,
namely existence of equilibrium in static models with a nite number of com-
muters, conditions su¢cient for uniqueness of equilibrium in static models
with a continuum of commuters, and existence and uniqueness of equilibrium
in dynamic models of simple networks with exogenous bottlenecks.
An independent, modern literature in transportation economics examines
necessary conditions at a Nash equilibrium for the dynamic tra¢c assignment
problem. Heydecker and Addison (2005) consider what happens along a link
as a black box, and derive such a condition. Of course, if such a black box is
made more specic, the necessary condition can be rened. Zhang and Zhang
(2010) use a bottleneck model and obtain a more specialized condition.
In their survey, de Palma and Fosgerau (2011, p. 208) conclude: The
extension of the dynamic model to large networks remains a di¢cult problem.
So far, existence and uniqueness of equilibrium have not been established (in
spite of many attempts).
The game-theoretic literature on externalities, for example Sandholm (2001),
has the potential to be useful in our context. However, the strong symmetry
assumptions used, that yield strong and interesting conclusions, exclude almost
all of the games of interest to us. For example, they exclude the simple special
case of our model where there are two nodes called home and work with one
link between them, but two departure times. Hofbauer and Sandholm (2007)
study congestion games with a continuum of players, but their assumptions on
congestion rule out the type of dynamic micro-interaction along a link that is
the focus of our work. Sandholm (2007) considers an evolutionary approach
to setting optimal tolls in the case where there is a nite number of iden-
tical commuters (so they have the same home and work locations) modied
by an idiosyncratic preference component, without the symmetry assumption
but with further structure on the evolutionary process.5 Hu (2010) explores
Nash equilibrium with continuous departures for a single commuting corridor
4To apply Schmeidlers work to obtain Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, it is important
that the set of pure strategies be nite. In our model, the interpretation is that the set of
departure time strategies is nite.
5It is also interesting to inquire how tolls would be implemented in practice in these
models, since in theory the toll is based on the overall strategy chosen, namely the route
and/or departure time. Would toll booths along the route be able to implement this?
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for one morning rush hour. It is shown that with a specic dynamic for equi-
librium selection, the equilibrium exists and is unique. As we shall illustrate
in the last subsection of the introduction, multiple equilibria are quite natural
in models of commuting.
The transportation engineering literature is naturally concerned more with
practical tra¢c issues than with the questions we pose; see, for example, Da-
ganzo (2008). Typically this literature takes the behavior of individuals,
namely their choice of routes and departure times, as exogenous. Thus, Nash
equilibrium is not studied.6 For example, Zhu and Marcotte (2000) use pre-
determined (exogenous) departure times. The closest relative to our model
in this literature is the cell transmission version of the Lighthill-Whitman-
Richards (LWR) model; see Daganzo (2008) section 4.4.6. There are some
important di¤erences. First, the LWR model takes departures as exogenous
and possibly smooth, whereas we do not. Second, like most models of tra¢c,
the LWR model employs queues or bottlenecks when there is congestion. In
contrast, we assume that tra¢c slows as a function of tra¢c density. These
two important di¤erences express themselves as di¤erences in the equilibrium
behavior of the models.7 More recent examples include Han et al (2013)8 and
Han et al (2015).
Turning next to the mathematics literature, our mathematical problem on
one link boils down to a conservation law coupled with a discontinuous dif-
ferential equation. Even with just one link between an origin and destination
with exogenous departure times and homogeneous commuters, existence and
uniqueness of the resulting tra¢c pattern is a di¢cult question that requires
interesting assumptions and techniques to resolve. A major issue is the exis-
tence and uniqueness of behavior of the system when the initial conditions can
be discontinuous. This is important to us, as we dont want to place restric-
tions on the joint behavior of individuals when we eventually consider Nash
equilibrium. The mathematics were introduced in Bressan (2000, chapter 6)
6For example, the rst appearance of a utility function in Daganzo (2008) is at the bottom
of p. 315. The body of the book ends at the top of p. 319.
7In other parts of the transportation engineering literature, existence and uniqueness of
Nash equilibrium is studied in the context of a bottleneck model, using an S-shaped wish
curve (dening ideal bottleneck exit times). In these models, it is unclear what happens if
an atom of commuters arrives at the bottleneck at the same time, or if the fragile condition
of an S-shaped wish curve is violated - the complement appears to be open and dense in the
set of wish curves.
8In addition to queues, this work also features a highly non-standard notion of Nash
equilibrium.
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and Garavello and Piccoli (2006); that work is based on Bressan (1988) and
Bressan and Shen (1998).9 The key paper for our purposes is the seminal
work of Strub and Bayen (2006), who remark in their conclusions (p. 564),
However, results are still lacking in order to generalize our approach to a real
highway network. For such a network, PDEs are coupled through bound-
ary conditions, which makes the problem harder to pose.10 Once we have
introduced notation and concepts, we shall remark further on both related
literature in mathematics and alternative approaches to solving the induced
mathematical problem.11 An important contribution of Strub and Bayen
(2006) is actually the denition of a solution to the mathematical problem
of determining ow in the one link system with exogenous departures, since
there were issues of either existence or uniqueness with many of the previous
attempts. The technical di¢culties in the literature are partly the result of
working with functions of bounded variation with a two dimensional domain:
time and distance. The (discontinuous) conservation law tells us that cars are
not lost over a link, with initial condition zero cars on the link and boundary
conditions corresponding to the departure of cars. The conservation law is
coupled with a (discontinuous) di¤erential equation that gives progress of a
car over the link. An important mathematical problem is relating properties
of functions on two dimensions that are of bounded variation to their variation
on each dimension separately. Part of our mathematical contribution here is
to relate the solution of the conservation law of Strub and Bayen (2006) to a
9Although the motivation for Bressan (2000) is the simple tra¢c problem with one home
location, one work location, and one link, the mathematical problem solved in this book is
di¤erent from the economic problem that motivates it. This will cause us some headaches.
In particular, the initial condition used in the book is the tra¢c at various locations along
the link at time 0, trivially 0 in our model. Tra¢c is not allowed to enter the link after
time 0. We are much more interested in boundary conditions that, for an arbitrary time,
give the tra¢c entering a link at location 0. Nevertheless, the mathematics introduced in
this book are very useful.
10There are many challenges that we must address to extend their results from one link to
many. For example, it is di¢cult to prove that the link exit density has the same properties
as the link entry density, that is used as the entry density for another link. A secondary
challenge is that boundary conditions are formulated in terms of density (cars per mile)
when they should be formulated in terms of volume (cars per hour). Although we take the
proper approach for boundary conditions using volume, the technicalities can be simplied
some if we were to use density.
11We note in frustration that much of the literature cited here is motivated by mathematics
rather than economics. Beyond Strub and Bayen (2006), to our knowledge there is no result
that applies directly even to the case of two nodes and one link.
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Carathéodory solution to the discontinuous ordinary di¤erential equation by
applying Biles et al (2014). To accomplish this, we employ techniques initially
developed by Friedrich et al (2018), using properties of the Godunov scheme,
to obtain bounds on total variation of the solution to the conservation law for
each of time and space separately.12
In the end, we are able to embed the more elementary framework of Strub
and Bayen (2006) in a model with an arbitrary transport network, heteroge-
neous commuters and endogenous choice of departure times and routes, exam-
ining Nash equilibrium as well as Pareto optimum. Unfortunately, we cannot
apply their results directly, but must open up the details of their clever proof.
The nal literature related to our work is the literature on internet conges-
tion. Although we interpret our model as tra¢c on roads for consistency of
exposition, it applies as well to packets on links in the internet. A ne survey
of this literature can be found in Jacobsson (2008). Due to the complexity of
the discrete model, a continuous model was developed by Kelly et al (1998),
forming a foundation for our work. Much of the literature has a focus on
exogenous departures and routes, not Nash equilibrium. Other parts of the
literature, such as Kelly et al (1998), focus on steady states of the dynamic
model with congestion pricing, or what we call a static model with congestion
pricing. There is likely an unexplored relationship with potential games, as
represented for example by Sandholm (2007).
1.3 Preview
In summary, the main di¤erence between our work and most of the literature
is that we use the ne microstructure from transportation engineering and the
mathematics of conservation laws to address more macro economic questions.
We do not use exogenous departure and route choices, nor do we employ
bottlenecks or queues. Instead we allow endogenous choice of departure times
and routes, but require that tra¢c slow down as a function of endogenous
congestion on an arbitrary transportation network. To our knowledge, this
represents a new class of models of commuting that has fewer black boxes (such
as delay functions in the standard literature) and, more importantly, di¤erent
properties compared with others.
Although the notation used to describe the models formally is burdensome,
we will give examples and intuition for the results in addition to the techni-
12Since most of the examples of conservation laws come from physics, these results might
also be of use there.
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calities. We formulate both a static model, where time plays no role, and a
dynamic model, where it does play a role. We assume that commuters have
an inelastic demand for one trip per day to work. Future work should extend
this to elastic demand.
Our results and the outline of the balance of the paper are as follows.
Although classical results concerning Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimum
are replicated in our context, we highlight novelties. In the next subsection of
the introduction, we detail and preview our results with minimal notation by
using the simplest example, a network with two nodes and one link where all
commuters live at one node and commute to their jobs at the other. In Section
2, we give our notation and specify the general static (timeless) and dynamic
models. At this point, we prove classical results in our context, but also nd
assumptions su¢cient for existence and uniqueness of a tra¢c pattern over
time and across links given a set of boundary conditions (corresponding to a
xed strategy prole) in the dynamic model. Moving on to Nash equilibrium,
we nd conditions su¢cient to prove it exists, and show that it is generally
not unique. Section 3 gives our applications. First, we show that the static
model cannot be viewed as a reduced form of the dynamic model, where time
is explicit. Then we study the welfare properties of Nash equilibrium in
the context of a generalization of a tree network in the dynamic model. Nash
equilibrium of the morning commute will generally be ine¢cient, whereas there
exists a Nash equilibrium of the evening commute that is e¢cient. Finally,
Section 4 gives our conclusions. All proofs are contained in an Appendix.
1.4 Example
1.4.1 Our Basic Model
We begin with a simple example to illustrate how the model works and the
intuition behind our results. Consider measure 1 commuters uniformly dis-
tributed on the interval [0; 1] with nodes 1 and 2. Each commuter commutes
from node 1 to node 2 each day. For simplicity, we consider only the morning
rush hour at this juncture. Denote the capacity of the link in terms of volume
(cars per hour) by x 2 R+. Suppose that the time it takes to travel the link
at the speed limit is t(1; 2) = 1. In the static model, the travel time is given
by 1 if the average number of travellers does not exceed capacity x of the road,
and by 1
x
otherwise. This means that if road link capacity is exceeded, then
tra¢c slows down in proportion to the ratio of excess commuters to capacity,
9
maxf1; 1
x
g. For example, if x = 1=2, then the travel time for a commuter on
the link is 2. There really are no choices here for the commuters or a social
planner optimizing e¢ciency, since the route is xed and the model is static;
there are no departure times to be chosen.
Now consider a dynamic version of the model. Route choice is still xed,
but departure (and consequent arrival) times are a choice variable of the com-
muters. We model departure times in R+, and we call the required arrival
time at the destination node 2 (say 9 AM) A 2 R+. There is no penalty for
arriving at work early, but the penalty for arriving at work late is 1.13 This
is mainly for illustration. We shall consider more general penalties for both
early and late arrival in the remaining sections. They add some complications.
Again, in this simple model there is no route choice. But there is a choice of
departure time. First, we illustrate how, for any choice of departure times by
all commuters, the travel time to the destination node 2 can be computed. It is
assumed that the latter is minimized by each individual commuter at a Nash
equilibrium (given the choices of others), and the social planner maximizes
a utilitarian welfare function that is minus the integral of commuting times
subject to the arrival constraint.
The speed of a particular cohort of commuters who depart at the same time
is computed as follows. Begin with the local density of commuters on the road
at a particular place on the route and at a particular time. This local density
at a given place and time is computed as the limit of neighborhoods on the
road of total (measure of) commuters in the neighborhood divided by the one
dimensional size of that neighborhood. The limit is taken as the length of the
neighborhood goes to zero. The result will be the density of commuters (with
respect to distance) at that place and time. Then, as in the static model,
tra¢c slows down in proportion to the ratio of excess commuter density to
capacity, where capacity is in terms of volume, namely commuters per hour.
In terms of notation, for our examples  = min
n
1; x
f
o
, where  is speed and
f is density.
An example will help illustrate. Again consider the commuters uniformly
distributed on [0; 1]. Suppose that all the commuters at 0 depart at time 0,
all the commuters at 1 depart at time 1, and so forth. Set the arrival time
A = 2. We compute tra¢c speeds (in this case, the arrival time constraint
will not bind). With these departure times, when road capacity is high so
13Notice that for this example, if there is positive probability of arriving late to work, the
payo¤ is  1 and the commuter is indi¤erent among all strategies with positive probability
of arriving late.
10
that x  1, then capacity does not bind. The unit interval of commuters
moves from origin to destination at full speed and perfect synchrony, and the
local density of tra¢c is always 1 except for commuters with labels 0 and 1.
The density around them is 1
2
since there is nobody on one side of them (for
example the commuters with label 0 have nobody in front of them). But this
does not alter their speed, since they are already at the speed limit. In theory,
at least, commuters can catch up with those ahead of them (if the ones ahead
are travelling slower) and slow themselves down.
What if x < 1? We consider two simple patterns; for more concreteness,
for example one can take x = 1=2. Set the arrival time A = 2
x
. First, suppose
that commuters depart uniformly in the time interval [0; 1
x
] with volume x and
density 1. Tra¢c slows down by a factor of 1
x
relative to the no congestion
case; thus, tra¢c speed for the commuters is uniform at x, tra¢c density (cars
per mile) is 1, and tra¢c volume (cars per hour) is speed multiplied by density,
or x.14 It takes 1
x
time to traverse the link, so the last commuters (labelled 1)
reach the destination at 2
x
. Call this the congested commuting pattern.
Now consider the same general departure pattern as in the preceding para-
graph, with commuters labelled 0 beginning travel at time 0, whereas com-
muters labelled 1 begin their trip at time 1
x
. Again set the arrival time A = 2
x
.
The local density of commuters on the route is x, so all commuters travel at
the speed limit 1, and volume is x. Thus, travel time for all commuters is
1. The last commuter arrives at time 1
x
+ 1 < 2
x
. Call this the uncongested
commuting pattern.15
These two simple commuting patterns, or strategy proles, serve to illus-
trate the computation of local density, speed, and volume. Of course, the
calculations can be much more complicated in, for example, more intricate
commuting networks or for more intricate departure patterns. The simple
patterns also serve to illustrate the important role played by arrival time. It
is rather evident that for the xed arrival time as specied at A = 2
x
, these
strategy proles are Nash equilibria.16 Notice that all commuters reach work
14Sharp readers will notice that the density in front of the commuters departing at time
0 is 0. But such commuters represent a set of measure 0.
15There are more uncongested commuting patterns, for example when x = 1=2 and de-
partures are uniform on times [0; 3]. The volume of departures at each time is 1=3. The
density f with respect to distance is 1=3 in locations and at times where there are com-
muters. Therefore, speed  = min(1; x=f) = 1. The travel time of each commuter is 1.
The last commuter arrives at 4.
16There are actually many other Nash equilibrium patterns associated with this example
that feature no congestion. We focus on these two patterns for simplicity.
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by the arrival time A for either pattern, but travel time is longer for the con-
gested commuting pattern. Thus, welfare can di¤er across dynamic commuting
patterns even for this simple example. It is evident that the uncongested com-
muting pattern Pareto dominates the congested commuting pattern.17 Finally,
it is vital to see that more than one departure density can be consistent with
a given departure volume.
1.4.2 The Classical Model with Queues
A crucial comparison is between our model, with endogenous congestion and
speed, and the classical models of the literature that use queues. We argue
that the equilibrium (or even disequilibrium) behavior of our model is di¤erent
and much more realistic, illustrated as follows.
First, consider the model detailed previously, but for simplicity set x =
1
2
. For the congested commuting pattern, it takes each commuter time 2 to
traverse the link. The rst commuter arrives at time 2, whereas the last arrives
at time 4. For the uncongested commuting pattern, it takes each commuter
time 1 to traverse the link. The rst commuter arrives at time 1, whereas the
last commuter arrives at time 3.
We turn next to a model with queuing. There are many variations on the
bottleneck model, particularly in continuous time. For example, Arnott et
al. (1993) assume that it takes no time to get from home to a bottleneck, and
that after exiting the bottleneck, the commuter immediately arrives at work.
The variation we use is closer to our model, and is due to Zhang and Zhang
(2010). A link consists of two parts, a main body rst and then a queue at the
end. The main body has innite capacity so tra¢c ows at the speed limit
independent of any congestion. The queue or bottleneck at the end of the
main body operates with limited capacity, using a rst-in-rst-out principle.
For our particular example, it takes time 1 for any commuter to traverse the
main body (independent of congestion), and the queue allows volume 1 to exit
the queue at any given time.
What does Nash equilibrium with a queue look like for this example?
Everyone leaves as soon as possible (at time 0), arrives at the bottleneck at
time 1, and the last commuter leaves the bottleneck at time 2. Here, we
assume that if everyone arrives at the bottleneck at the same time, the order
17It is important to point out that our basic example of a network is series-parallel and
even extension-parallel, but some Nash equilibria of the dynamic model are not weakly
Pareto e¢cient.
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in which they proceed is random. This equilibrium does not resemble at all
the ones obtained using our model of endogenous congestion.
1.4.3 Comparison of the Static and Dynamic Models
Consider next the comparison of the static with the dynamic model. The rst
pattern, the congested commuting pattern, we study for the case x < 1 seems
to be the analog of the static case, since tra¢c speed is constricted. But the
second, uncongested pattern does not seem to have an analog. Thus, the static
and dynamic models have di¤erent Nash equilibrium predictions. Moreover,
if the dynamic analog of the static equilibrium is the congested commuting
pattern, it is Pareto dominated by another pattern present in the dynamic
model but disallowed by the static model.
In fact, we can say more. In section 3.1 below, we describe how to ex-
tend this example so that there is no equilibrium of the dynamic model even
remotely resembling the equilibrium of the static model.
With the model specied as we have outlined, generally a Nash equilib-
rium in pure strategies or a pure strategy optimum might not exist. So in
what follows, for the dynamic model, we must simplify the problem. This
is accomplished by using a xed, nite set of possible departure times that
divide equally the time scale in the model. When commuters choose a depar-
ture time, they are distributed uniformly over the interval with midpoint their
chosen departure time, and length equal to the distance between allowable
departure times. With this structure, a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies
and a pure strategy optimum exist. Moreover, for our example, the congested
and uncongested commuting patterns we have specied are Nash equilibria of
the model, and the uncongested commuting pattern is Pareto optimal. Notice
that in this simple example, there is a Nash equilibrium that is Pareto optimal.
This will be generalized in Section 3.2.
What follows below just makes the ideas behind our simple examples for-
mal and general, for instance allowing an arbitrary commuting network where
commuters have various di¤erent origins and destinations.
2 The Commuting Model
Readers who wish to understand the content of the work through examples only
can focus on Examples 1-4 below and then skip to section 4.
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2.1 The Static Model: Equilibrium and Optimum
Here we lay out the details of a game with an atomless measure space (con-
tinuum) of players; a nite set of nodes at which the players live, or to which
they commute, or through which they commute; and a nite set of transport
links between the nodes with exogenous capacity.
To begin, the measure space of commuters is given by (C; C; ) where C is
the set of commuters, C is a -algebra on C, and  is a positive, non-atomic
measure.18 We assume that singletons of the form fcg for c 2 C are in C; that
for all c 2 C, (fcg) = 0; and 0 < (C) <1.
The origins and destinations in the commuting network are given by a
nite set of nodes, denoted by m;n = 1; 2; :::N . Let N = f1; 2; :::; Ng. The
commuting network itself is given by a nite set of links between nodes. The
capacity of any direct link (with no intermediate nodes) between nodes m and
n is given by xmn 2 [0;1], whereas xnn =1. If a direct link between nodes
m and n does not exist, then xmn = 0.
What remains is to specify the strategies and payo¤s of the commuters.
In the static game, there is no choice of time of departure or arrival. There
is only route choice. We assume that each commuter has a xed origin node
and a xed destination node, with inelastic demand for exactly one trip be-
tween the origin and destination. Thus, there is an exogenous, measurable
origin map O : C ! N and an exogenous, measurable destination map D :
C ! N . Notice that there can be heterogeneity among commuters in origins
and destinations. This will create heterogeneity in the reduced form utility
functions of the commuters.
Let k be the map that projects a vector onto its coordinate k. A route,
denoted by r, is a vector of integer length ` no less than 2. Next we dene
the set of all routes, R:
R
` =

r 2 N ` j for i = 1; 2; :::; `  1; xi(r)i+1(r) > 0
	
R 
1[
`=2
R
`
To avoid trivial situations, we assume that if there is a positive measure
of commuters with a particular origin and destination, that there is some
route between the nodes. A commuting length map is a measurable map
l : C ! f2; 3; :::g. A commuting route structure is a pair (l; R) where l is a
18Skorokhods theorem implies that we could, with some loss of generality, restrict atten-
tion to the unit interval with Lebesgue measure.
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commuting length map and R is a measurable map R : C ! R such that for
i = 1; 2; :::; l(c) 1; x(i)(i+1) > 0, and almost surely for c 2 C, 1(R(c)) = O(c)
and l(c)(R(c)) = D(c).
Given a commuting route structure (l; R), its ow f 2 RN
2
+ is given by
f(m;n) = (fc 2 C j 9k 2 f1; 2; :::; l(c)   1g with k(R(c)) = m and
k+1(R(c)) = ng) for m;n = 1; 2; :::N . We assume that the length of the
link between nodes m and n is (m;n)  0 for m;n = 1; 2; :::N . If the link
is congested, then the travel time increases. For our examples, it increases in
proportion to the excess of commuters above capacity, max
n
1; f(m;n)
xmn
o
.19 For
instance, if the number of commuters is twice the capacity of a link, then the
travel time is doubled. We ask that the reader bear this special case in mind,
since we use it in all of our examples to give concrete intuition.
More generally, we can allow tra¢c to slow down according to any well-
behaved function of the number of commuters at a distance on a link and
link capacity. Therefore, we specify the function  : R+  R+ ! R++ where
 (f; x) is the speed of tra¢c with ow f on a link with capacity x. We assume
that for xed x,  is continuous and non-increasing in f . For our examples,
 (f; x)  min
n
1; x
f
o
.
Although it is di¢cult to discuss travel time in a model that is inherently
atemporal, this is to be viewed as a sort of steady state. Under this interpre-
tation, f is the measure of commuters (repeatedly) passing through the link
on their route.
The time cost of a commuting structure (l; R) for commuter c is
(l; R; c) = (1)X
f(m;n)2NNji(R(c))=m;i+1(R(c))=n for some 0il(c) 1g
(m;n)
 (f(m;n)); xmn)
Thus,   is the objective or payo¤ function for each commuter. The utilitarian
19There is an issue of normalization here, namely whether f is divided by  or not. In
essence, it depends on whether a link that is twice as long is half as congested for the same
number of commuters on the link. This depends on the interpretation of the static model,
whether congestion is viewed as a pulse of commuters or whether they are uniformly spread
out over the link. In this paper, we take the view that in the model without time, twice as
many commuters on a link results in twice the congestion, no matter the length of the link.
However, if one takes the view that length of the link matters, the result is simply division
of our f by , and this makes no essential di¤erence in the the results we obtain. As we
show in Section 3.1, interpretation of the static model is di¢cult.
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welfare function for the static model is
U(l; R) =  
Z
C
(l; R; c)d(c)
A Nash equilibrium of the static model is a commuting structure (l; R) such
that almost surely for c 2 C, there is no route r of length ` for commuter c
such that
(l; R; c) >
X
f(m;n)2NNji(r)=m;i+1(r)=n for some 0i` 1g
(m;n)
 (f(m;n); xmn)
Existence of Nash equilibrium in pure strategies can be proved by applying
Schmeidler (1973, Theorems 1 and 2). Rosenthal (1973) proves that a Nash
equilibrium in pure strategies exists even when there is a nite number of
commuters. Sandholm (2001) shows that equilibrium exists and is unique
under additional conditions, primarily that speed is strictly decreasing in link
usage f .
Next we prove (informally) that an optimum exists. The problem can
easily be reduced to optimization of the utilitarian welfare function over a
compact set as follows. Notice rst that there is a nite number of types of
commuters, dened by their origin-destination pairs. Instead of using route
choice for each commuter, employ as control variables the measure of each
type following each route. Thus, the social planner controls a nite number
of variables in a compact set using a continuous objective, so a maximum is
attained.
Example 1: We note that due to the congestion externality, the Nash equi-
libria are unlikely to be Pareto (or utilitarian) optimal. To see this informally,
consider an example with 3 nodes. All commuters travel between nodes 1 and
3. There is a direct route, and an alternate route that runs via node 2; see
Figure 1. The alternate route takes longer than the direct route for each xed
number of commuters below capacity because it requires a longer distance of
travel. For example, each road has capacity 1 and takes 1 unit of time to cross
when running below capacity, so the longer route uses 2 units of time when
running below capacity, whereas the shorter route takes 1 unit of time when
running below capacity.
2

% &
1   !  3
Figure 1: Nash equilibrium is not Pareto optimal
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Suppose that there is measure 5
2
of commuters. A Nash equilibrium of this
model has the direct route running above capacity, with measure 2 commuters
using it for a total travel time of 2, and the indirect route running below
capacity (:5 measure, with a total travel time of 2) such that the travel time
to work for each commuter is the same. To create a Pareto improvement over
the Nash equilibrium, simply move some commuters (say measure :5) from the
direct to the indirect route. The travel time on the indirect route (namely 2)
is the same as at the Nash equilibrium, even for the commuters switched to
that route, whereas the travel time for those on the direct route decreases (to
1:5).20
2.2 The Dynamic Model: Equilibrium and Optimum
The basics of the dynamic model are the same as those for the static model.
To di¤erentiate the notation, we will add dynamic to the names and add
time  as an argument of functions. In the dynamic model, each commuter
chooses both a departure time (from their origin node) and a route. Routes
were discussed in the previous subsection. We allow a commuter to depart at
any time  d 2 [0; T ]. As we shall see shortly, it is important that this set be
bounded.
A dynamic commuting route structure is a triple ( d; l; R) where  d : C !
[0; T ] is a measurable function giving departure times for all commuters, l is
a commuting length map and R is a measurable map R : C ! R such that
almost surely for c 2 C, 1(R(c)) = O(c) and l(c)(R(c)) = D(c).
At this juncture, there is an issue concerning the detail in which we model
congestion on each link in the dynamic model. It varies in the literature
we have cited. The simplest way to model this is to look only at average
congestion on a link. More complicated is to assume that as tra¢c ebbs and
ows, the congestion at the end of the link determines tra¢c speed on the
entire link. The most detailed model allows cars to catch up with each other
over the course of a link. We use this most detailed model, but assume that
link capacity is constant across the link. This is without loss of generality,
provided that capacity changes only a nite number of times on a link. In
that case, we just add more nodes and links with di¤erent capacities in series.
We shall dene commuter progress from origin to destination through a
di¤erential equation in distance. But rst we must dene progress on each
20Notice that in this example, even though the Nash equilibrium is not Pareto e¢cient, it
is weakly Pareto e¢cient.
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component of a route in a dynamic route structure. Fix a dynamic route
structure ( d; l; R). The basic idea is this. From departure time to the end
of the rst link, we follow the di¤erential equation for congestion for the rst
link, and then begin on the second link, and so forth. A crucial assumption
made here and in most of the literatures we cite is that cars cannot pass. For
notational simplicity, for i = 1; :::; l(c), dene  i(c) to be the time that node
i(R(c)) is reached. Evidently,  1(c) = 
d(c).
Given a dynamic commuting route structure ( d; l; R), we shall associate
with it a function mn(m(c); ) that gives as its value the distance travelled
on link mn by commuter c at time  who begins travel on link mn at time
m(c).
21 In the end, this function will be increasing in its second argument
but decreasing in its rst argument. Does such a function exist, and is it
unique? Fix such a function bmn. To ease notation, compute inductively
 i+1(c) = inff
0 > 0 j bi(R(c))i+1(R(c))( i(c);  0) = (i(R(c)); i+1(R(c))g
(2)
Then we can compute its density at time  on link mn at distance , calledbf : N 2  R2+ ! R+, and written as bf(m;n;  ;).22 It is the density of
commuters (per unit distance) at time  and at distance  along link mn,
and it is given by the (possibly discontinuous) partial di¤erential equation or
conservation law :
@ bf(m;n;  ;)
@
+
@( bf(m;n;  ;))
@
= 0 (3)
where
(m;n;  ;)  
 bf(m;n;  ;); xmn  bf(m;n;  ;) (4)
is dened to be the ux.23 The ux is the volume of commuters passing
through a point per unit of time. We abuse notation slightly and sometimes
write
mn(f) =  (f; xmn)  f
For our example, note that mn = min fxmn; fg.
Equation (3) is actually the fundamental conservation law of transportation
economics applied to this model. As explained in Bressan (2000, equation 1.2),
21A formal denition of this function will be given in (6) below.
22In terms of notation, f will be a scalar representing an arbitrary value of the density,
whereas bf is a density function.
23The literatures we have cited use inconsistent denitions for the terms ow and ux
in this context. Here we are using denitions from the mathematics of conservation laws.
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if we x an interval of locations on a link, the measure of commuters inside
this interval can only change over time from inows into the interval from the
left and outows from the interval to the right. Another interpretation of
equation (3) states that the change with respect to time in commuter density
at a given place and time can be found by looking at the change in the ux
(commuters per hour) at preceding locations nearby.
Next we compute
@bmn(m(c); )
@
= 
 bf(m;n;  ;bmn(m(c); )); xmn (5)
This describes the progress made by commuters on each link of the entire
dynamic commuting route structure for any time  . Equation (5) is the
coupled discontinuous di¤erential equation discussed in the introduction.
Unfortunately, the coupled system dening bf and b, namely (2), (3), and
(5), is technically challenging. The reason is that we cannot restrict  d,
the function dening the departure strategies of players, beyond assuming
that it is a measurable function. Each individual makes a choice, and this
is not necessarily coordinated. Discontinuities in departures can result in
discontinuities in @bmn=@ that rule out our ability to use standard techniques
from the theory of ordinary di¤erential equations as well as the contraction
mapping theorem. Instead, we use Biles et al (2014).
Even if we can retrieve a well-dened bmn for each  d function, the issue
then becomes the fact that there might not exist a Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies, since the space of pure strategies is a continuum. Schmeidler (1973)
relies heavily on the fact that the number of pure strategies available to players
is nite.
We address the problems of discontinuities in boundary conditions and an
innite number of strategies at once by simplifying the dynamic model. Fix
 where T= is an even integer, and dene the departure strategy space to
be f ; 3 ; :::; (T=   1)g. This makes the strategy space nite. We assume
that all the commuters who choose, say,  will be randomly and uniformly
distributed on (0; 2), those who choose the strategy 3 will be randomly and
uniformly distributed on (2 ; 4), and so forth. The examples in the introduc-
tion t this framework because they use a uniform distribution of departure
times. Moreover, they survive as Nash equilibria no matter how ne the grid,
even in the limit where commuters can choose their precise departure time.
We view  as a commuters intended departure time, where the actual depar-
ture time is the intended time plus a small random variable. The constant 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can be small.24
Having addressed these initial challenges, we come upon another that is
generated by the mathematics of conservation laws. Consider the simple
one link model used in the introduction where link capacity is 1; the cohort
departing at times (0; 2) has low density, say 1=2, and hence high speed; and
the cohort departing at times (2 ; 4) has high density, say 3=2. Common
sense and observation of the real world says that the rst cohort will begin at
high speed whereas the second cohort will begin at lower speed. A distance gap
with no commuters will form between them and expand along the link. This
is not only the common sense solution, but will also obtain in the solution
proposed in the literature if there is an & > 0 start time gap between the
cohorts.
Surprisingly and unfortunately, that is not the solution in the case where
there is no such starting time gap. The solution in this case involves the
initiation of a third step between the rst two, with further step initiation
possibly following. There is no distance gap between the cohorts. This can
be found in unnumbered equations in Bressan (2000, p. 110, Case 2) and
Strub and Bayen (2006, p. 559). More detail can be found in Section 4.5
of Bressan (2000), in particular Figure 4.5 and especially Figure 4.6. Thus,
there is a discontinuity in the solution along a link as & ! 0. Since we do not
consider the solution at & = 0 to be the right one, we are forced to take limits
of solutions as & ! 0.
It should be obvious by now that we cannot simply apply the LWR model,
that relies on the mathematics of conservation laws, as suggested in the trans-
portation engineering literature.
We begin by giving the intuition for speed calculations, and then provide a
formal proof of existence and uniqueness of the function bf , from which every-
thing else can be calculated. For example, @bmn=@ can be calculated from
(5) once bf is known.
For speed calculations, it is useful to dene some concepts. A threshold is
24The classical problem with addressing this issue is that, in the limit with no restrictions
on departure time choice, the Nash equilibrium might be in mixed strategies. It is doubtful
that an equilibrium in mixed strategies is useful in the applied context here. In ne but
nite departure grids, this corresponds to extreme oscillations (say between 0 and 1) in
adjacent grid elements. The weak limit would be a strategy prole that is constant at 1=2.
Utilities could easily be weakly discontinuous, and thus the Nash equilibrium would be in
mixed strategies. An alternative, used in the stochastic games literature, is to perturb
utilities. In our context, this does not seem very natural.
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a location on the network where the speed of commuters is di¤erent on the two
sides of the threshold at a given time. An important example of a threshold is
a node. Of course, a node is a form of a stationary threshold, since it doesnt
move over time. Next we will investigate thresholds that move, appear and
disappear. An example of a threshold of this type is the boundary between
two cohorts, where a cohort is dened as a group of commuters with the same
route and departure time choices.
Fix a dynamic commuting route structure ( d; l; R). Let b d(c;  0) =  d(c)+
 0, where  0 is a random variable uniformly distributed on (  ; ), denote the
actual departure time of commuter c, that di¤ers from the chosen departure
time  d(c) by at most  as described just above. To reduce the notational
burden, we shall generally suppress the second argument ( 0) in any functionb . Then b 1(c) = b d(c). In general, given b i, we will dene inductively b i+1.
Fix any origin node m and destination node n 6= m. On each segment mn,
dene a subset of commuters who travel together on link mn as:
mn(c)  fc
0 2 C j  d(c0) =  d(c); for some i  l(c),
1(R(c)) = 1(R(c
0)),:::, i 1(R(c)) = i 1(R(c
0));
i 1(R(c)) = i 1(R(c
0)) = m, i(R(c)) = i(R(c
0)) = ng
Assume for now that mn is strictly increasing in f . Then the default speed
for commuter c is given by
Smn(c) = 
 
 1mn ((mn(c))=2) ; xmn

The appearance of  1mn here will be discussed in detail in Remark 6 below.
At this point, it is useful simply to note that we must translate departure
volume (cars per hour) to departure density (cars per mile). The literatures
we have surveyed do not account for this.
The default speed might be counterfactual, but it is a useful construct.
At the default speed, intervals of commuters never overlap with each other.
When they never overlap, the time on this link is exactly (m;n)=Smn(c), sob i+1(c) = b i(c)+(m;n)=Smn(c). Similarly, mn(b i(c); ) = Smn(c)  [  b i(c)]
where i(R(c)) = m. But there are two other possibilities beyond this rst
case. The second case is when commuters using di¤erent routes blend with
each other or separate beginning at a node; this is actually a generalization
of the concept of default speed. The third case is if a segment of commuters
catches up with another along a link. We consider each of these in turn.
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The second case that is possible in the model is when commuters using
di¤erent routes blend or separate at a node. For the case where they separate,
if they are not combined with commuters using other routes, they move at the
default speed on the link. But this is just to give intuition. To ease notation,
dene 0(R(c
0))  1(R(c
0)) for all routes R and almost all commuters c, and
dene b 0(c)  b 1(c) for almost all commuters c. Formally, dening the set of
commuters approaching link mn from link m0m at the same time:
m0mn(c; )  fc
0 2 C j b j 1(c0) 2 (b i(c)  ;b i(c) + );
i(R(c)) = m, i+1(R(c)) = n;
j(R(c
0)) = m, j+1(R(c
0)) = n and j 1(R(c
0)) = m0 g
The speed of commuters is given by:
Smn(c) = 
 
 1mn
 X
m02N
lim
!0
(m0mn(c; ))
2
!
; xmn
!
Provided that they dont catch up with anyone else, their time on the link is ex-
actly (m;n)=Smn(c), so b i+1(c) = b i(c)+(m;n)=Smn(c) whereas mn(b i(c); ) =
Smn(c)  [   b i(c)] where i(R(c)) = m. This is actually the most general
form of the speed, time, and distance functions.
On each segment mn, we say that commuter c catches up with commuter
c0 on link mn if
i(R(c)) = j(R(c
0)) = m, i+1(R(c)) = j+1(R(c
0)) = nb j(c0) < b i(c)
(m;n)
Smn(c)  S

mn(c
0)
< b i(c)  b j(c0)
The slower commuter c0, who is una¤ected, continues on at the same speed
as before the faster one c catches them. If commuter c catches up with
commuter c0 on link mn, dene the catch up time, for i(R(c)) = j(R(c
0)) =
m, i+1(R(c)) = j+1(R(c
0)) = n, as   = b i(c)+Smn(c0)[bj(c) b i(c0)]Smn(c) Smn(c0) . At the rst
time when a member of one cohort (dened above) catches up with a member
of another cohort along a link, a new threshold is created at this time and
distance. As it crosses the threshold, the tra¢c in the faster cohort slows down
to the speed of the cohort immediately in front of them by increasing its density
at the threshold to match that in the slower cohort. Thus, for all c00 2 C with
k(R(c
00)) = m, k+1(R(c
00)) = n, then b k+1(c00) =   + (m;n) mn(b i(c);)Smn(c0)
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whereas mn(b k(c00); ) = mn(b i(c);  ) + [    ]  Smn(c0) for all  >   on
this link.
To abbreviate notation, let bf(m;n;  ;)   lim!0 bf(m;n;  ;   ) andbf(m;n;  ;)+  lim!0 bf(m;n;  ;+). A threshold on linkmn is dened by
( ;) 2 [0; T ]  [0; (m;n)] such that bf(m;n;  ;)  6= bf(m;n;  ;)+. The
threshold itself moves along the link at speed

 bf(m;n;  ;)+  bf(m;n;  ;)   
 bf(m;n;  ;) bf(m;n;  ;)+ .
We shall remark on this further after a formal statement of the rst result.
To prepare for this rst result, let us make explicit the assumptions we will
use.
Assumption 1: For each xed xmn, speed 0 <  (f; xmn) <1 is Lipschitz
continuous and non-increasing in f .
Assumption 1 means that car speed with no congestion is bounded, speed
is a continuous (though not necessarily smooth) function of congestion, and
speed does not increase with more cars. As an alternative to assuming that 
is Lipschitz, we could directly assume that  is Lipschitz, as that is what we
use. But since both f and  are bounded (see below after Assumption 2), 
Lipschitz implies that  is Lipschitz.
Next, we need some preparation for Assumption 2. Eventually, we will
need a bound on the total variation of boundary conditions at the start of a
link that is uniform across links. The purpose is to have a compact space
that we will use to nd a xed point. A su¢cient (and weakly necessary)
condition is a hierarchy of links that we will specify next. Let the set of links
be denoted by:
L  f(m;n) 2 N N j m 6= ng
We postulate a complete preorder on L denoted by , with its asymmetric
part denoted by . Recall that R is the set of all possible routes. Next, we
shall restrict routes to R  R. For ` = 2; 3; :::; N , dene
R` 
r 2 R` j For all i = 2; 3; :::; `  1, (i(r); i+1(r))  (i 1(r); i(r)), i(r) 6= j(r) for i 6= j
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Assumption 2: Routes r are restricted to:25
r 2 R 
N[
`=2
R`
There are two pieces to this assumption. First, we have restricted route
length to N or less. In fact, all that is needed is a nite upper bound on
route length. We choose N for simplicity. The assumption that nodes are not
repeated along a route makes indexing progress along the route easy. These
assumptions are made mainly to keep notation simple.
The second piece is more interesting. Let us begin with the mathematics.
The purpose of this assumption is to provide a uniform upper bound on total
variation (across time) of boundary or entry conditions for the node at the
start of a link. Without this upper bound, we lose both compactness of the
space of initial conditions and the ability to solve the di¤erential equation (5).
We need compactness for a xed point theorem, and the ability to solve the
di¤erential equation in order to compute travel times and payo¤s.
To obtain such an upper bound, we must examine behavior when cohorts
merge at a node and travel the next link together. Variation in density in
one cohort can be transmitted to the other at the initial node. For example,
consider two cohorts that merge at a node. If one has a constant entry density
over time, but the other has either an increase or decrease in entry density,
the density of the rst cohort will generally not be constant once it enters the
link. Thus, total variation can build up. Even if commuters dont travel in
circles, the variation that is transmitted can build up along links that form a
closed loop. So to prevent this, we impose a hierarchy on links.
Turning next to the economics of this assumption, it means that commuters
(or packets for the internet) must not be travelling on links that form circles.
However, travel in opposite directions on links or routes is ne; in fact, this is
common for both the internet and commuting applications. For example, if
there is a central business district, then one way to satisfy the assumption is to
have commuters from each suburb travel towards it during morning rush hour
and away from it in the evenings. Circular roads or links forming a circle are
also ne, as long as the circle is not completed by overlapping commuters. In
the context of the internet, the assumption provides a warning concerning the
25Technically, Assumption 2 means that a dynamic route structure is restricted: R(c) 2 R
almost surely.
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potential build up of total variation in circles on the internet, even if no set
of packets travels in a circle, due to the transmission of total variation across
cohorts that travel the same link at the same time.
All of our examples (including a generalization of directed trees used in
section 3.2) satisfy this assumption.
Turning next to analysis of the system, there are two immediate, use-
ful consequences of bounding the commuting route length by N . First, the
set of routes that are possible for a commuter to choose, henceforth called
R, is nite. Second, we can examine bounds on our endogenous functionbf(m;n;  ;). Evidently, bf(m;n;  ;)  0. Now consider upper bounds.
An upper bound for departure density is  1mn

(C)
2

. But it is useful to have
a uniform bound on density beyond departure density. As we have seen, when
one cohort of commuters catches up with a slower cohort ahead of it, this co-
hort of commuters slows down by building up density so it is the same as that
of the slower cohort. Thus, this does not change the upper bound on density.
Where density can build up is at nodes, where cohorts can combine. It is
important to note also that boundary conditions at the origin of any route are
stated in terms of volume (cars per hour) rather than density (cars per mile).
Thus, an upper bound on endogenous density is given by the maximal density:
f = N maxm;n
 1
mn

(C)
2

.
Denition: Let t be an upper bound on the time it will take until the last
commuter reaches the end of their route:
t = T +N  max
m;n2N , m6=n
"
(m;n)

 
f; xmn
#
This time will be nite as long as  > 0.
At this point, there is an important but technical issue that must be ad-
dressed. We shall use Schauders theorem26 to show that for any choice of
strategies by commuters, namely the choice of route and departure time for
each, the density on each link of commuters in space and time as well as total
commuting time are well-dened, namely such a density exists and is unique.
This requires some continuity of commuting times in initial conditions on a
link. Moreover, we employ Schmeidlers theorem to prove existence of Nash
equilibrium for the dynamic commuting game. One of the requirements of
26See Smart (1974).
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Schmeidlers results is that utility is continuous (in the weak topology on L1)
in the strategy prole of all commuters. For the dynamic model as stated,
there is an important type of discontinuity that must be addressed.
The discontinuity is related to moving thresholds. In particular, if a thresh-
old moves backward through a node, a discontinuity in commuting times and
payo¤s can result. Consider the following example represented in Figure 2:
 C
A B %
 =) 
&
 D
Figure 2: A discontinuity
Tra¢c moves from left to right, with origin at node A through a node
represented by B. After passing through the node, some tra¢c heads up and
to the right on route ABC, whereas other tra¢c heads down and to the right
on route ABD. Suppose that after passing through node B, tra¢c heading
down and to the right on route ABD travels at high speed, and the tra¢c
volume and density are steady. Suppose further that a large, slow cohort
passes through the node and heads up and to the right on route ABC, but is
followed along the same route by a faster cohort that catches up to the slower
one along the upper right link BC, after node B. Thus, a threshold is formed
and the faster cohort slows down to match the speed and density of the slower
one. If the volume of this faster cohort is so large that the threshold27 backs
up along the upper right link BC and through node B to the left link AB, we
claim that a discontinuity in the speed and payo¤s of tra¢c heading down and
to the right on route ABD can occur. The speed of the steady tra¢c heading
down and to the right is reduced to the speed of tra¢c at the threshold, thus
increasing in a discrete manner its density and the time needed to travel the
link down and to the right, BD. This can happen despite the fact that much
of the tra¢c on the rst link AB proceeds up and to the right, because the
density of tra¢c using the lower link BD jumps up when the threshold passes
backward through node B to the left link AB.
A su¢cient (but not necessary) condition to prevent this type of disconti-
nuity would be one that prevents thresholds from moving backwards, whether
through a node or not. Thus, we assume:
27Notice that the cars themselves always have positive speed.
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Assumption 3: mn(f) is a non-decreasing function of f .
This assumption prevents thresholds from moving backwards, because it
says that the volume of consumers moving past a given point will not decrease
if density goes up. The direction of movement of thresholds is governed by
local volume (cars per unit time), not by local density (cars per unit distance).
With this additional assumption to address the discontinuity, commuting times
and payo¤ functions will be shown to be continuous in strategies.
For our examples, note that mn(f) = min fxmn; fg satises this assump-
tion.
In this framework, when density f increases, (f) weakly decreases whereas
mn(f) weakly increases. Thus, speed and volume are (weakly) monotoni-
cally related. This rules out some interesting cases of hypercongestion, where
there are multiple speeds that will accommodate the same volume. Although
it is more complicated, we conjecture that an extension of the model could
accommodate these cases by eliminating Assumption 3 and allowing payo¤
discontinuities at nodes using the following technique. Strub and Bayen (2006)
allow a boundary condition at the end of a link as well as the beginning of a
link, and this can combined with Khans (1989) generalization of Schmeidler
(1973) to upper semicontinuous payo¤ functions to obtain existence of Nash
equilibrium. However, as Strub and Bayen (2006, section 2) note, boundary
conditions on both ends of a link can cause inconsistencies (or gridlock) in
the density on a link, and the possibility of no solution. That is why they
use a weak formulation of boundary conditions that allows violation of such
boundary conditions under certain circumstances.
Unlike the entire extant literature, we state origin departure boundary
conditions (cars entering a link per hour) in terms of volume rather than
density (cars per mile). This is a very important distinction. A strategy
prole of commuters determines initial volume, namely departures per hour,
and not departure density, unless density is completely determined by volume.
In general, both departure volume and departure density must be specied in
Nash equilibrium.
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Denitions: Let

 
n
(b ; ) 2 0; t2 j   bo (6)
Dmn 

mn : 
! [0; (m;n)] measurable j for (b ; ) ;  b 0;  0 2 
: mn(b ;b) = 0,mn (b ; )  mn  b 0;  0  (0)   b   b 0+ j    0j	
D 
NY
m;n=1, m6=n
Dmn
We use square block metric for the Lipschitz condition as a matter of con-
venience.
The following denition comes from Strub and Bayen (2006), adapted to
our context. Interpretations immediately follow the denitions. For further
discussion, see also Bressan (2000).
Denition: A collection of measurable functions
nbf(m;n; ; );bmnoN
m;n=1, m6=n
,
where bf(m;n; ; ) : [0; t]  [0; (m;n)] ! [0; f ] and bmn 2 Dmn, is called
a solution to the conservation law (3) with initial and boundary conditions
if, for every m and n (m 6= n), for every k 2 R, for every C1 function
'mn : [0; t] ! R+, for every C
1 function  mn : [0; t]  [0; (m;n)] ! R+, the
following hold:
0 
Z (m;n)
0
Z t
0
 bf(m;n;  0; 0)  k  @ mn( 0; 0)
@
(7)
+sign
 bf(m;n;  0; 0)  k  hmn  bf(m;n;  0; 0)  mn(k)i  @ mn( 0; 0)
@
d 0d0
and there exist 2(N   1)2 sets of Lebesgue measure zero: E0mn  [0; (m;n)],
ELmn  [0; t], such that for all m;n = 1; :::; N , m 6= n,
lim
!0,  =2E0mn
Z (m;n)
0
 bf(m;n;  ; 0) d0 = 0
lim
!0,  =2ELmn
Z t
0
Lmn
 bf(m;n;  0; ); mn( 0)'( 0)d 0 = 0
where
Lmn (a; b)  sup
2I(a;b)
(sign(a  b)  [mn(a)  mn()])
I (a; b)  [inf(a; b); sup(a; b)] (8)
bmn(b ; ) = Z 
b

 bf(m;n;  0;bmn(b ;  0)); xmn d 0
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mn()  (9)
 1mn
 
(fc 2 C j 1(R(c)) = m, 2(R(c)) = n,
 d(c)    < g)
2
+
NX
m0=1, m0 6=m
m0m
 bf(m0;m;  ; (m0;m))!
Remark 1: The crucial but subtle connection between the functions bf andb is through equation (9), called the boundary condition, and denition (2).
Condition (9) gives entry into a link by those just departing from their origin
node and those continuing their travel through the node from other links. We
shall (temporarily) make the assumption that mn is strictly increasing, so
that its inverse is well-dened.
Remark 2: What we call a solution is actually a renement of other solution
concepts used in the literature that are more obviously related to equation (3).
The least restrictive of these is the concept of distributional solution, followed
by the more restrictive weak solution. The (yet more restrictive) solution
concept we use is generally called an entropy weak solution in the literature.
Motivation for using this solution is that although we have existence theorems
for all of these solution concepts, uniqueness holds only for the entropy weak
solution concept. There is also intuition for the renement in terms of stability,
usually called admissibility conditions, in the mathematics literature we have
cited.
Remark 3: It is important to provide at least a heuristic explanation,
part of the folklore in the literature, about why this represents a solution
to the partial di¤erential equation or conservation law (3), since there is no
obvious connection between the partial di¤erential equation and what we call a
solution.28 Suppose that  can be chosen so that @ mn
@
is close to an indicator
function for some set in [0; t]  [0; (m;n)] and @ mn
@
is close to an indicator
function for that same set multiplied by 1
( bf(m;n; ;);xmn) , so that we can focus
on the integrand in inequality (7). If we can choose another function so
that these derivatives are close to  1 multiplied by these functions,29 then
28Evidently, this is one of the barriers to entering this literature.
29Notice that these restrictions are on the derivatives of  mn rather than on  mn itself, so
it is possible to make the derivatives negative while satisfying the non-negativity constraint
on  .
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inequality (7) implies:  bf(m;n;  ; )  k+
sign
 bf(m;n;  ; )  k  hmn  bf(m;n;  ; )  mn(k)i  1

 bf(m;n;  ; ); xmn = 0
Dividing by sign
 bf(m;n;  ; )  k, we obtain bf(m;n;  ; )  k+hmn  bf(m;n;  ; )  mn(k)i 1

 bf(m;n;  ; ); xmn = 0
Now choose kh = bf(m;n;    1h ; ) for h = 1; 2; 3; ::: Then dividing by 1h and
taking limits as h!1 yields
@ bf(m;n;  ; )
@
+0mn
 bf(m;n;  ; )  @ bf(m;n;  ; )
@

1

 bf(m;n;  ; ); xmn = 0
This expression is the same as (3).
Theorem 1: Suppose that  satises Assumption 1 (so that mn is Lip-
schitz) and that feasible routes are restricted to satisfy Assumption 2. Sup-
pose further that for all m;n 2 N (m 6= n) ux mn satises f   f
0   
[mn(f)  mn(f
0)] for f > f 0, where  > 0,30 and that both  1mn

(C)
2

6= ;31
and mn(0) = 0. Then to each dynamic commuting route structure (
d; l; R),
there corresponds a unique solution
nbf(m;n; ; );bmnoN
m;n=1, m6=n
.
Remark 4: The case where mn is weakly increasing and Lipschitz, as in
the examples, will be dealt with when existence of equilibrium is considered.
For technical reasons, it is easiest to consider this case as a limit of the cases
where mn satises the conditions of Theorem 1. Bressan (2000, p. 2) suggests
an example where  is strictly increasing:
(f) = a1

ln
a2
f

f (0  f  a2)
Remark 5: One issue concerning our system is how we dene a solution.
Our system in bf is generally rather discontinuous, so it requires special treat-
ment. There are alternatives to the technique we use, which we consider to
30A su¢cient condition is: mn is C
1 with 0mn > 0.
31This condition is su¢cient, but not necessary, as illustrated by the example in the
introduction.
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be the most straightforward given our framework. One such alternative is
to assume that the ux function mn is smooth and either strictly convex or
strictly concave. The conservation law is then called strictly hyperbolic; see
Bressan (2000), particularly section 10.2. We can then dene a Filippov so-
lution (Filippov, 1973) to this problem, that was introduced into economics
by Ito (1979).32 Colombo and Marson (2003) and particularly Marson (2004)
can be applied to obtain existence and uniqueness of a solution.33 However,
we do not place further restrictions on the ux.
Remark 6: It is important to discuss the assumption  1mn

(C)
2

6= ;. We
are taking departure strategies as times of departure. This leads naturally to
boundary conditions for the initial link of a route that are phrased in terms of
cars per hour, or tra¢c volume. To start cars on a route, we must rephrase
this in terms of density, cars per mile, so that the conservation law (3) can
be applied. Since volume at zero density must be zero by denition (4),
this assumption ensures that for every volume that is possible as a boundary
condition for the initial link, there is a density that will generate it. In the
case where the density  1mn () is not unique, the density selected from the
inverse must be specied as part of the equilibrium concept.
Remark 7: There is an interesting conceptual issue regarding the tran-
sition between links on a route at nodes. Depending on what one wants to
conserve in passing from one link to the next, either volume (cars per hour)
or density (cars per mile), the transition could be di¤erent or even impossi-
ble. We note that the entire literature takes the position that it is density,
not volume, that should be conserved, since boundary conditions are always
phrased in terms of density. Consider, for example, (f) = x
f
. Then volume
is constant at x, whereas density can be any positive number. For this ex-
ample, transitions between links with di¤ering x that preserve volume could
be impossible. Nevertheless, we take the position here that it is volume that
is conserved when passing through a node, as given in (9), as it seems more
natural and appropriate. Thus, speed functions such as (f) = x
f
are excluded
32Formally speaking, we could introduce the general denition of a Filippov solution and
then show that there exists one with nite total variation, but here we follow Columbo and
Marson (2003) and Marson (2004) who skip this step because this fact is already well-known.
33In fact, Strub and Bayen (2006) use a strictly concave ux function in their application
in section 5 to the I-210 in Los Angeles. Thus, they could have used a Filippov solution
instead of a weak entropy solution for their application.
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by the assumption mn(0) = 0.
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The proof of Theorem 1 can be found in the Appendix. Formally, we prove
that for given departure times and route choices the system behavior given byn bf(m;n; ; );bmn(; )oN
m;n=1
exists and is uniquely dened. To accomplish
this, we apply Schauders theorem in a slightly unorthodox manner to the set
of boundary conditions for each node, where the boundary conditions lie in the
space of functions of bounded variation with respect to time. More precisely,
the boundary conditions give the density of cars at the start of a link at a
particular time, as in (9) or bf(m;n; ; 0). We could alternatively use volume
for the xed point instead of density, but since volume and density are in
one-to-one correspondence under the assumptions of Theorem 1, there is little
di¤erence.
Next we examine existence of Nash equilibrium in pure strategies in our
dynamic model.
The time cost of a dynamic commuting structure ( d; l; R) for commuter
c is
R 
 
b l(c)(c;) (d(c)+)
2
d . This is the expected time cost taken over all
perturbations of departure time.
Fix an arrival time A 2 [0;1]. Next we introduce the arrival penalty
function P : R+ ! R+. To give intuition, think of  =  l(c)(c). The general
arrival penalty is a function given by
P ()  0 where P (A) = 0
Next, we turn to some examples. In the introduction we required that:
Almost surely for c 2 C, b l(c)(c)  A
Thus, P () = 0 for   A whereas P () = 1 for  > A. It is actually
more common in the literature to use an asymmetric linear penalty function;
see Arnott et al (1993). Such a specication will be used in Example 2 below.
We can allow further generalization, for example heterogeneous required arrival
times A, but at the cost of messier notation. Note that in the framework
with a nite number of departure times, the penalty is actually the expectation
of P for the given choice of strategy, since commuters are randomly assigned
using a uniform distribution over a small departure time interval. We make
this precise in equation (10) next.
34There might also be some interesting, unexplored duality between links/density on the
one hand, and nodes/volume on the other.
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The individual payo¤ function for the dynamic model is thus:
u(c;  d; l; R)   
Z 
 
b l(c)(c;  0)  ( d(c) +  0) + P (b l(c)(c;  0))
2
d 0 (10)
The utilitarian welfare function for the dynamic model is
U( d; l; R) =
 
Z
C
Z 
 
[b l(c)(c;  0)  ( d(c) +  0) + P (b l(c)(c;  0))]
2
d 0d(c)
A Nash equilibrium in pure strategies of the dynamic model is a dynamic
commuting structure ( d; l; R) such that almost surely for c 2 C, there is no
route r of length `  N and departure time  d0 for commuter c such that,
computing arrival times b 0 as in Theorem 1 for the new route and departure
time,Z 
 
b l(c)(c;  0)  ( d(c) +  0) + P (b l(c)(c;  0))
2
d 0 >
Z 
 
b 0`(c;  0)  ( d0 +  0) + P (b 0`(c;  0))
2
d 0
We note that due to the congestion externality, the Nash equilibria are
unlikely to be Pareto (or utilitarian) optimal. Example 2 below will make this
precise.
Next, in Theorem 2, we shall prove existence of Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies for our model with discrete and nite departure times by applying
Schmeidler (1973, Theorems 1 and 2). For the model with a continuum of
departure time strategies, we can only obtain existence of -equilibrium in pure
strategies. It is also worth noting that since mn will not be required to be
strictly increasing, we must modify (9) to:
mn() 2 
 1
mn
 
(fc 2 C j 1(R(c)) = m, 2(R(c)) = n,
 d(c)    < g)
2
+
NX
m0=1, m0 6=m
m0m
 bf(m0;m;  ; (m0;m))!
This adds another layer of complication to Nash equilibrium in the case where
mn is not strictly increasing.
Theorem 2: Under Assumptions 1-3, if the penalty function P is contin-
uous35 and for all m;n 2 N (m 6= n)  1mn

(C)
2

6= ; and mn(0) = 0, there
exists a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
35Although some of our examples, such as the one in the introduction, feature a discon-
tinuous P , a nearby continuous P with su¢ciently steep slope just after the arrival time
would work just as well, but would distract from the point of the example.
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One can prove that a utilitarian optimum exists for the discrete departure
time model under the assumptions of Theorem 2. Instead of looking at a
continuum of individual strategies, give the social planner the control vari-
ables that are the measure of commuters using each route at each departure
time. The control vector is nite-dimensional. Assume, to begin, that mn is
strictly increasing in f . Under the assumptions used in Theorem 1, densities
and utility levels are well-dened for each departure and route strategy prole.
In the proof of Theorem 2, found in the Appendix, it is shown that destina-
tion arrival times are continuous in the departure and route strategy prole.
Thus, the utilitarian objective is continuous as a function of the measure of
commuters using each route and departure time, so an optimum exists.
Consider next the case where mn is non-decreasing in f . As usual, take
a sequence of initial conditions converging to the supremum. These initial
conditions are in terms of volumes and routes, but there exists associated
departure densities (per mile instead of per minute) associated with these
volumes such that the supremum is approached. In the proof of Theorem
1, the only use made of mn strictly increasing in f is to prove that bf is
unique, so there is an associated sequence of densities such that the optimum
is approached. Following the remainder of the proof of Theorem 2 (that proves
continuity of the objective in the strategy prole), and applying the dominated
convergence theorem, the optimum will be achieved in the limit.
Example 2: What does Nash Equilibrium look like in the case of a linear
penalty function? This is important for applications, as much of the literature
uses such a specication. It is actually quite interesting. Suppose that
P () =
(
  (A   ) if A  
  (   A) if   A
where ,  > 0. Notice that the late work arrival penalty  should generally
be larger than the early arrival penalty . It would be logical to ip these
coe¢cients for the commute home, but in some cases it might also make sense
to use departure penalties rather than arrival penalties in this reversal.36
(a) To x ideas, we consider the example from the introduction, with one
link and two nodes, modied for this penalty function. Capacity of the link is
x = 1, whereas travel time on the uncongested link is 1. At a Nash equilibrium,
utility must be equalized across commuters, for otherwise everyone will imitate
the happiest ones only. Fortunately for urban economists, this is a familiar
36Some of these observations belong to a referee.
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condition. There is mass 2 of identical commuters. Consider an example with
2 departure times, 1
2
and 3
2
. Those who choose departure time 1
2
actually leave
at a random time distributed uniformly between 0 and 1, whereas those who
choose departure time 3
2
actually leave at a random time distributed uniformly
between 1 and 2. Let A = 7
2
and  =  < 1
3
. It will turn out that in
a Nash equilibrium, the commuters who choose departure time 1
2
travel at
the speed limit, whereas the commuters who leave at time 3
2
travel slower
and arrive later. The volume  of departures will be 1 on [0; 2]. Suppose
the (endogenous) density of commuters who choose departure time 1
2
is called
w < 1, whereas the (endogenous) density of commuters who leave at time 3
2
is called w0 > 1. For those who choose departure time 1
2
, their travel time
is 1 whereas their expected early arrival penalty is 2. For those departing
at time 3
2
, their travel time is w0 whereas their expected early arrival penalty
is   (7
2
  (w0 + 3
2
)). Setting these negative utilities equal to each other, we
obtain w0 = 1
1 
. The parameter w can be set at any value less than 1. Notice
that, similar to Example 1, we can create a Pareto improvement by reducing
the density (and increasing the speed) of agents who choose departure time 3
2
.
This disrupts the equal utility condition.
(b) To examine how equilibrium depends on the grid, we modify the exam-
ple to allow any choice of departure time. Take  =   1
5
. Nash equilibrium
volume will again be constant at 1 on [0; 2], but starting density will vary; it
is 1 + 
1 
  for  2 [0; 2]. The total cost of travel for a commuter depart-
ing at time  inclusive of penalty is 1 + 
1 
  + (7
2
     (1 + 
1 
)) =
1 + 5
2
 + ( 
1 
     
2
1 
) = 1 + 5
2
, independent of departure time  . If the
last arrival is to occur exactly at 7
2
(so the constraint on departure times does
not bind), take  = 1
5
. More generally, other equilibria have departure density
as + 
1 
  for   1. If the last arrival is to occur exactly at 7
2
, then  and
 satisfy  = 3
2
  2
1 
. There remains a large number of equilibria, although
welfare is the same in all of them.37
Note that the static model cannot generate equilibria that feature departure
density monotone increasing in time.
37It is possible, but messy, to extend this example to allow departure times beyond 2
(with a larger mass of commuters). In that case, the late arrival penalty trades o¤ against
a lower density for such departure times. The commuters departing after time 2 will catch
up to the commuters departing at time 2 and slow down. However, their commuting time
will be shorter than those departing at time 2 due to a lower initial density.
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3 Applications
3.1 Can the Static Equilibrium be Supported by a Dy-
namic Equilibrium?38
Given identical exogenous data for the static and dynamic commuting games,
are Nash equilibrium densities in the static and dynamic models the same?
In other words, is the static model a reduced form of the dynamic model?
This is important for addressing the issue of whether the static model makes
sense. For if the answer to this question is negative, then there should be no
interest in the static model, since its equilibrium behavior is di¤erent from the
analogous dynamic model, and the real world is dynamic.
For simplicity, we return now to the examples used in the introduction,
namely where there is no penalty for early arrival and an innite penalty for
late arrival. One could imagine that the static model represents some sort
of steady state of the dynamic model, where commuters are introduced at
constant volumes and densities at all the nodes, and the densities in the links
are constant over time. But with a xed arrival time (say 9 AM), a steady
state does not make sense. The time prole of equilibrium departures will
generally not be constant over time, since everyone must get to work by the
arrival time. Even if arrival time varied by commuter, one would not expect
to see a steady state attained.
For brevity in examining the equilibria of the static and dynamic models,
we use the example in the introduction and compare equilibrium speeds and
travel times in the two models.
Example 3: Take x = 1
2
for the example in the introduction, and take the
arrival time to be A = 3. For the static model, speed is 1
2
and time on the link
for each commuter is 2. For the dynamic model, the congested commuting
pattern is no longer a Nash equilibrium, because the last commuter arrives at
time 4. The uncongested commuting pattern remains a Nash equilibrium, but
features speed 1 and travel time 1.39
There is a clear trade-o¤ in constructing the dynamic model, the point of
this short subsection. Do we want a model closer to the static model in terms
38The ideas in this subsection owe much to Anas (2007) and to discussions with Alex
Anas.
39Without an arrival time, its easy to argue that neither the static nor the dynamic model
is a reasonable model of the morning commute.
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of equilibrium, or do we want a model closer to reality?
Verhoef (1999) studies a similar problem in a very di¤erent class of models,
and concludes (p. 365) that, For static models of peak demand, it was argued
that for such models to be dynamically consistent, rather heroic assumptions
on the pattern of scheduling costs have to be made.
3.2 Welfare Properties of Nash Equilibrium
Equilibrium selection is an important issue in one shot congestion games with
Pigouvian congestion taxes. Under such taxes, there can be multiple Nash
equilibria, only some of which are e¢cient.40 As remarked in the introduction,
Sandholm (2007) shows that with a nite number of commuters, an evolution-
ary process, and Pigouvian taxes, the outcome will be e¢cient. A major
limitation of this work is the assumption of a common utility function with
idiosyncratic perturbations, which seems to rule out heterogeneous origins and
destinations.
Although that approach is clearly interesting, we take a completely di¤er-
ent approach here, motivated by our examples. A major advantage of our
approach is that we can compare non-trivial commutes (home to work) with
their reverses (work to home), to our knowledge absent in the literature. As
we wish to focus on departure times rather than routes in the dynamic model,
we discuss the following restrictions:41
Denitions: An outbound shrubbery network is a set of routes Rout 
R such that for any r 2 R`\Rout, r0 2 R`
0
\Rout, 1(r) = 1(r
0) and there do
not exist 1 < i < ` and 1 < i0 < `0 with i 1(r) 6= i0 1(r
0) and i(r) = i0(r
0).
An inbound shrubbery network is a set of routes Rin  R such that for any
r 2 R` \ Rin, r0 2 R`
0
\ Rin, `(r) = `0(r
0) and there do not exist 1 < i < `
and 1 < i0 < `0 with i(r) = i0(r
0) and i+1(r) 6= i0+1(r
0).
These are generalizations of inbound and outbound (directed) tree net-
works. The di¤erence is simply that we allow only the outermost node to be
the same for two or more branches, possibly forming a loop. Simple examples
will be given below.
40We do not provide an example here, both because they are available in the literature
(for more macro models) and because, as will be apparent from Theorem 3, examples in our
framework with non-constant (or non-zero) Pigouvian taxes will have relatively complicated
route structures. For instance, a one link example wont work.
41Extensions will be discussed at the end of this subsection.
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In terms of commuting, an inbound shrubbery network might be a reason-
able model of commuting from home to work, whereas an outbound shrubbery
network might be a reasonable model of commuting from work to home. In
terms of electronic networks, this might not be a good model of the internet,
but tree structures are often used in local area networks. The property of
interest for an outbound shrubbery network is preventing mergers of routes at
nodes where tra¢c continues together along the next link.
Why we are introducing a restrictive condition like this? It is one way to
sort out the e¢ciency properties of Nash equilibrium in our dynamic model.
What is perhaps strange but interesting is that on a two way network, commut-
ing to work may be ine¢cient, whereas commuting to home might be e¢cient.
In other words, reversing the commute on a directed network can change the
e¢ciency properties of Nash equilibrium.
Notice that both types of shrubbery networks satisfy Assumption 2: R \
Rout  R, R \Rin  R.
We wish to examine the similarities and di¤erences between commuting
from home to work and commuting from work to home. Since networks are
arbitrary in our general framework, we focus on shrubbery, and begin our
analysis with an example. Most of the intuition can be gleaned from this
example. What is important for our purposes is asymmetry.
Example 4:42 First, consider the commute from a common home location
O on the right to a common work location D on the left, via through either
node A or node B followed by a merge at node C, as represented in Figure 3:
 A
. -
 (= (=   O
D C - .
 B
Figure 3: Example of an inbound shrubbery network
42Notice that the network used in this example is extension parallel. For the static model,
the Nash equilibrium is weakly Pareto e¢cient. For the dynamic model, it depends on the
direction of commute.
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For expositional clarity, consider the path OAC to be just one link, and
similarly forOBC; we have inserted nodes A andB only to distinguish between
the two paths. Suppose that rush hour is from time 0 to time 1 with two
possible departure times: 1=4 and 3=4, where commuters choosing the rst
departure time are uniformly distributed over actual departure times [0; 1=2]
and commuters choosing the second departure time are uniformly distributed
over actual departure times [1=2; 1]. The length of links OAC and OBC is 1,
whereas the length of link CD is 2. Speed on links between nodes O and C is
given by min
n
1
f
; 1
o
. Speed on the link between nodes C and D is given by
min
n
1
f
; 1
o
+ 1
8
. There is no arrival time penalty; its not very natural when
comparing a commute and its reverse, though the examples and theorem can
likely be extended in this direction. There is measure 2 commuters travelling
from node O to node D.
Lets rst examine Nash equilibrium. Consider the symmetric strategy
prole where measure 1=2 commuters choose route OAD and choose depar-
ture time 1=4 and thus are uniformly distributed with volume 1 over [0; 1=2],
whereas measure 1=2 commuters choose route OBD and choose departure time
3=4 and thus are uniformly distributed with volume 1 over [1=2; 1]. As always,
we must be careful about how volume (cars per hour) translates into density
(cars per mile), particularly at nodes. In this case, we set density f = 1, so
speed is 1. Similarly, commuters choosing route OBD are split: measure
1=2 choose departure time 1=4 and are uniformly distributed over [0; 1=2] with
volume 1, whereas measure 1=2 choose departure time 3=4 and are uniformly
distributed over [1=2; 1] with volume 1. Again, density f = 1. At the merge
node C, volume is 2. On the link CD, set density f = 8, so speed is 1
4
. Each
commuter experiences a total travel time of 9: travel time is 1 on the initial
link, and 8 on the link between node C and node D.
Next consider the following slightly asymmetric strategy prole that will
not be a Nash equilibrium. The volume and density departure schedule for
commuters who use link OAC remains the same as above. Commuters who
use link OBC will have the following departure schedule. Measure 1
2
depart at
time 1=4. For those who depart at time 1=4, volume is 1, the departure density
is 2, and initial speed is 1
2
. Measure 1
2
depart at time 3=4. For those who
depart at time 3=4, volume is 1, the departure density is 2, so initial speed is 1
2
.
The rst cohort to arrive at node C will be those using link OAC who depart
in [0; 1=2], and who arrive at node C at times in the interval [1; 3=2]. Next
are the commuters using link OAC who depart in [1=2; 1], and who arrive at
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node C at times in the interval [3=2; 2]. The next commuters to arrive are the
commuters using link OBC who depart in the interval [1=2; 1] and who arrive
at node C at times in the interval [2; 5=2]. Finally, the cohort of commuters
using link OBC in [1=2; 1] arrive at node C at times in the interval [5=2; 3].
Notice that the overlap in arrival times at node C is of measure zero. At the
merge node C, volume is 1, in contrast with the Nash equilibrium, where it
is 2. So tra¢c can travel faster along this segment; set density f = 8
9
and
speed at 9
8
. Therefore, in the end, travel time for all commuters using link
OAC is 1 + 9
4
= 13
4
< 9, whereas travel time for the commuters using link
OBC is 2 + 9
4
= 17
4
< 9. Clearly, this strategy prole Pareto dominates the
Nash equilibrium strategy prole, but is not a Nash equilibrium itself since
commuters using link OBC receive a lower utility level than those using link
OAC.43
Next we reverse the commute. The structure of permissible departure
times and speed as a function of density are the same. The new diagram is
represented in Figure 4:
 A
% &
 =) =)   O
D C & %
 B
Figure 4: Example of an outbound shrubbery network
A Nash equilibrium and utilitarian optimal strategy prole has measure
1=2 of each type (for a total of 1) departing work at node D at each of the
two departure times. The departure volume is 2, the departure density is 8,
whereas initial speed is 1
4
. Travel time on link DC is 8. Volume on the second
link (either CAO or CBO) is 1 whereas density is 1, so the speed is 1. Time
spent on the second link is 1, so the total travel time of each commuter is 9.
The next theorem makes this example more general:
Theorem 3: With an outbound shrubbery network, suppose that for all
r; r0 2 R` \Rout, ` 2(r) = ` 2(r
0), ` 1(r) 6= ` 1(r
0), `(r) = `(r
0) implies
43If the utility function is linear in money, the Pareto e¢cient allocation could be imple-
mented by charging a toll at node A that is equal to the di¤erence in travel time between
the two routes.
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x` 2(r)` 1(r) = x` 2(r0)` 1(r0) and x` 1(r)`(r) = x` 1(r0)`(r0). Under Assump-
tion 1, assuming44 @
@f
< 0, for all m;n 2 N (m 6= n),  1mn

(C)
T

6= ;,45
mn(0) = 0, and P = 0, there is a Pareto optimal
46 strategy prole that is also
a Nash equilibrium. Thus, there exists an e¢cient Nash equilibrium.
The proof of Theorem 3 is in the Appendix. Thus, under these additional
assumptions, e¢ciency can be achieved not through taxes, but by equilibrium
selection. Prisoners dilemma problems are ruled out by the structure of the
game, specically these additional assumptions. The rst half of Example 4
is an inbound shrubbery network that has no e¢cient Nash equilibrium, so an
analog of Theorem 3 for an inbound shrubbery network is impossible.
Since the simple example with two nodes and one link from the introduction
is trivially an outbound shrubbery network, it cannot be true that all Nash
equilibria are e¢cient. For such a simple example as well as for outbound
shrubbery networks (the evening commute) more generally, congestion pricing
is unnecessary if equilibrium can be selected, for example by using ow control.
In contrast, congestion pricing seems necessary for other commutes.
The result can likely be extended, for example allowing limited asymmetry
in the nal links of routes.
Finally, the larger implications of this subsection are important for the
comparison of the dynamic and static frameworks. It is hard to imagine an
analog of Example 4 in a static model. As should be apparent from the
examples, the normative properties of the dynamic and static models as well
as the number and variety of equilibria di¤er. A great deal of work remains
to be done on empirical and experimental approaches to the comparison of the
models, for example in equilibrium selection.
4 Conclusions
We have asked and answered several questions about commuting using two
models, one static and one dynamic. For each model, we have shown that a
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies exists for the one shot game, that a Pareto
44Sharp-eyed readers will notice that this condition is not satised by Example 4. We
can weaken this condition to: @
@f +
jg< 0, where + denotes the right-hand derivative of the
function and jg denotes evaluation of the derivative at the departure time prole that assigns
equal volume and density to all departure times and routes for a given type of commuter.
45As in Theorem 1, this condition is su¢cient but not necessary.
46Although we have not dened it formally, Pareto optimum is the usual concept in our
context of a continuum of agents.
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optimum exists, and that Nash equilibrium is generally not Pareto optimal.
Beyond that, we have shown that all Nash equilibria of the static model can
look very di¤erent from any Nash equilibrium of the dynamic model. Since
the static model features behavior unlike the dynamic one, we reject the former
as a reduced form of the latter and stick with the dynamic model. Finally, we
have examined the welfare properties of Nash equilibrium in the particular case
of a shrubbery network, and found that equilibrium might not be e¢cient for
the morning commute, but under some conditions there always is an e¢cient
Nash equilibrium for the evening commute. Thus, congestion pricing is more
important for the morning commute, whereas equilibrium selection (perhaps
via ow control) is more important for the evening commute. Further e¤ort
should be devoted to discovering the welfare properties of Nash equilibrium
on specic directed networks. In sum, what we have shown is that a model of
congestion using microfounded behavior has very di¤erent properties from the
reduced form models used in the literature.
Our commuting model can be reinterpreted as a model of internet con-
gestion. In this context, local area networks often have a tree or shrubbery
structure, so for example the results on e¢ciency of Nash equilibrium and
the consequences for congestion tolls can be reinterpreted in this framework.
Much work remains to esh out the application to the internet. At the mi-
cro level, routes are chosen by the TCP/IP software as a proxy for the user,
though the user chooses the time of day. At the macro level, whereas we have
only considered small users, it is likely that the supply side involves strategic
and competitive large players, such as internet service providers and content
providers. Moreover, there is likely asymmetric information, for example the
reason why internet speed might be slow might be unknown to some end users.
Malone et al (2017) o¤ers some interesting insights into these issues. Ques-
tions about equilibrium and optimum, like those put forth here, should be
addressed.
A natural question is: Are the Nash equilibria of the model stable under
ner departure grids? The equilibria that have a uniform distribution of
departures and arrival penalties survive no matter how ne the time grid is,
even in the limit when commuters can choose their precise departure time.
This includes the examples in the introduction, Example 3 and Example 4. It
also includes the cases addressed in Theorem 3, with an outbound shrubbery
network but no arrival time.
For simple examples, the Nash equilibria of our model can be solved ana-
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lytically. For more complex examples, the proof of Theorem 1 indicates that
a numerical solution technique involves nesting the solution of a discontinuous
system of di¤erential equations inside a xed point solution algorithm.
In a companion paper to this research, Berliant (2012) examines the set
of Nash equilibria in the innitely repeated versions of both the static and
dynamic commuting games, and the folk theorem is used to obtain these large
sets. There we present some preliminary evidence from the shutdown of an
expressway in St. Louis that commuters do not always play one shot Nash
equilibrium. We also discuss the application of the anti-folk theorem to our
specic game, namely conditions under which the Nash equilibria of the in-
nitely repeated game are the Nash equilibria of the one shot game.
Self-driving cars would represent another interesting application of the
model. Given the detailed microstructure of the model, a centralized sys-
tem of self-driving cars could compute and implement an e¢cient allocation.
A more decentralized system could have some cars that are self-driving and
others that are driven by humans. Nash equilibrium could be explored in this
context. A useful reference for these issues, with an emphasis on ride-sharing
and tolls, is Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2018).
In the same vein, the supply side of our model is passive. We have already
mentioned how strategic behavior in the internet application on the supply side
might be studied. Similarly, platform markets for ride services in the commut-
ing application would allow strategic behavior, for example a monopoly. This
would a¤ect not only the characteristics of Nash equilibrium, but equilibrium
selection as well. One might view ride matching and routing as a constrained
planning problem. This can also be applied to bus times and routes, where
the local government has market power.
Our model could be extended to allow elastic demand for travel to or from
work. The extension of the model to allow land markets and endogenous
choice of household residence and job location would also be interesting. The
extension to multiple lanes of tra¢c and passing would be useful. In part,
this can be accomplished by introducing more links between a pair of nodes,
as in Example 4, but this alteration does not allow lane changes.
The dynamic model should be applied to real world commuting. Since it
can accommodate an arbitrary (exogenous) route structure, it has both pos-
itive and normative content, especially regarding Pareto improvements. For
example, it can be used to perform cost benet analysis with respect to chang-
ing infrastructure and mass transit. More specically, it could be used to
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examine adding lanes (increasing capacity xi), adding public transit to reduce
road demand, and tolling links. A prerequisite would be to incorporate elastic
demand for trips into the model, since all of these alterations to the model
could have large e¤ects on demand. A rst step would be the calculation of
comparative statics in each of the exogenous variables.
References
[1] Anas, A., 2007. The Trips-to-Flows Riddle in Static Tra¢c Equilibrium:
How to drive a BMW? Unpublished manuscript.
[2] Arnott, R., A. de Palma and R. Lindsey, 1993. A Structural Model of
Peak-Period Congestion: A Tra¢c Bottleneck with Elastic Demand.
American Economic Review 83, 161-179.
[3] Beckmann, M., C.B. McGuire and C.B. Winsten, 1956. Studies in the
Economics of Transportation. Yale University Press: New Haven.
[4] Berliant, M., 2012. Daily Commuting. Working Paper.
[5] Biles, D.C., M. Federson and R. López Pouso, 2014. A Survey of Re-
cent Results for the Generalizations of Ordinary Di¤erential Equations.
Abstract and Applied Analysis http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/260409.
[6] Bressan, A., 1988. Unique Solutions for a Class of Discontinuous Dif-
ferential Equations. Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society
104, 772-778.
[7] Bressan, A., 2000. Hyperbolic Systems of Conservation Laws: The One-
Dimensional Cauchy Problem. Oxford University Press: Oxford.
[8] Bressan, A. and W. Shen, 1998. Uniqueness for Discontinuous ODE and
Conservation Laws. Nonlinear Analysis 34, 637-652.
[9] Colombo, R.M. and A. Marson, 2003. A Hölder Continuous ODE Re-
lated To Tra¢c Flow. Proceedings of the Royal Society of Edinburgh
133A, 759-772.
[10] Daganzo, C.F., 2008. Fundamentals of Transportation and Tra¢c Oper-
ations. Emerald Group Publishing: Bingley, UK.
44
[11] de Palma, A. and M. Fosgerau, 2011. Dynamic Tra¢c Modeling. In
A Handbook of Transport Economics, edited by A. de Palma, R. Lindsey,
E. Quinet and R. Vickerman. Edward Elgar: Cheltenham, UK. Ch. 9,
pp. 188-212.
[12] Filippov, A.F., 1973. Di¤erential Equations with Discontinuous Right-
hand Sides. Kluwer: Dordrecht, Netherlands.
[13] Friedrich, J., O. Kolb and S. Göttlich, 2018. A Godunov Type Scheme
for a Class of Scalar Conservation Laws with Non-local Flux. Working
paper.
[14] Garavello, M. and B. Piccoli, 2006. Tra¢c Flow on Networks: Conserva-
tion Laws Model. American Institute of Mathematical Sciences: Spring-
eld, MO.
[15] Han, K., T.L. Friesz and T. Yao, 2013. Existence of Simultaneous Route
and Departure Choice Dynamic User Equilibrium. Transportation Re-
search Part B 53, 17-30.
[16] Han, K., B. Piccoli and T.L. Friesz, 2015. Continuity of the Path Delay
Operator for LWR-Based Network Loading with Spillback. Working
Paper.
[17] Heydecker, B.G. and J.D. Addison, 2005. Analysis of Dynamic Tra¢c
Equilibrium with Departure Time Choice. Transportation Science 39,
39-57.
[18] Hofbauer, J. and W.H. Sandholm, 2007. Evolution in Games with Ran-
domly Disturbed Payo¤s. Journal of Economic Theory 132, 47-69.
[19] Hu, D., 2010. Equilibrium and Dynamics of the Discrete Corridor Prob-
lem. Unpublished manuscript.
[20] Ito, T., 1979. A Filippov Solution of a System of Di¤erential Equations
with Discontinuous Right-Hand Sides. Economics Letters 4, 349-354.
[21] Jacobsson, K., 2008. Dynamic Modeling of Internet Congestion Control.
Doctoral Thesis, KTH School of Electrical Engineering: Stockholm.
[22] Kelly, F.P., A.K. Maulloo and D.K.H. Tan, 1998. Rate Control for
Communication Networks: Shadow Prices, Proportional Fairness, and
Stability. Journal of the Operational Research Society 49, 237-252.
45
[23] Khan, M.A., 1989. On Cournot-Nash Equilibrium Distributions for
Games with a Nonmetrizable Action Space and Upper Semicontinuous
Payo¤s. Transactions of the American Mathematical Society 315, 127-
146.
[24] Konishi, H., 2004. Uniqueness of User Equilibrium in Transportation
Networks with Heterogeneous Commuters. Transportation Science 38,
315-330.
[25] Malone, J.B., A. Nevo and J.W. Williams, 2017. The Tragedy of the
Last Mile: Economic Solutions to Congestion in Broadband Networks.
Unpublished manuscript.
[26] Marson, A., 2004. Nonconvex Conservation Laws and Ordinary Dif-
ferential Equations. Journal of the London Mathematical Society 69,
428-440.
[27] Merchant, D.K. and G.L. Nemhauser, 1978. A Model and an Algorithm
for the Dynamic Tra¢c Assignment Problems. Transportation Science
12, 183-199.
[28] Ostrovsky, M. and M. Schwarz, 2018. Carpooling and the Economics of
Self-Driving Cars. NBER Working Paper 24349.
[29] Rosenthal, R.W., 1973. A Class of Games Possessing Pure-Strategy
Nash Equilibria. International Journal of Game Theory 2, 65-67.
[30] Ross, S.L. and J. Yinger, 2000. Timing Equilibria in an Urban Model
with Congestion. Journal of Urban Economics 47, 390-413.
[31] Sandholm, W.H., 2001. Potential Games with Continuous Player Sets.
Journal of Economic Theory 97, 81-108.
[32] Sandholm, W.H., 2007. Pigouvian Pricing and Stochastic Evolutionary
Implementation. Journal of Economic Theory 132, 367382.
[33] Schmeidler, D., 1973. Equilibrium Points of Non-Atomic Games. Jour-
nal of Statistical Physics 7, 295-301.
[34] Schrank, D., B. Eisele and T. Lomax, 2019. 2019 Urban Mobility Report.
Texas A&M Transportation Institute: College Station.
46
[35] Smart, D.R., 1974. Fixed Point Theorems. Cambridge University Press:
Cambridge, UK.
[36] Strub, I.S. and A.M. Bayen, 2006. Mixed Initial-Boundary Value Prob-
lems for Scalar Conservation Laws: Application to the Modeling of Trans-
portation Networks. In Hybrid Systems: Computation and Control,
Lecture Notes in Computer Science Volume 3927, edited by J. Hespanha
and A. Tiwari, pp. 552-567. Springer Verlag: Berlin.
[37] Verhoef, E., 1999. Time, Speeds, Flows and Densities in Static Models
of Road Tra¢c Congestion and Congestion Pricing. Regional Science
and Urban Economics 29, 341-369.
[38] Vickrey, W., 1963. Pricing in Urban and Suburban Transport. Amer-
ican Economic Review 53, 452-465.
[39] Vickrey, W., 1969. Congestion Theory and Transport Investment.
American Economic Review 59, 251-261.
[40] Zhang, X. and H.M. Zhang, 2010. Simultaneous Departure Time/Route
Choices in Queuing Networks and a Novel Paradox. Networks and Spa-
tial Economics 10, pp. 93-112.
[41] Zhu, D. and P. Marcotte, 2000. On the Existence of Solutions to the
Dynamic User Equilibrium Problem. Transportation Science 34, 402-
414.
5 Appendix: Proofs
5.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Preliminaries: We want to nd a unique xed point in initial conditions at
the start of a link over time, that we will call g, and progress along a link that
we have dened as . The main issue is consistency of the commuting pattern
with boundary values on links, namely the density of departures along a link
from a node over time.47 These initial conditions are partly exogenous, due
to the xed choice of departure times and routes for Theorem 1 (in contrast
with Theorem 2), and partly endogenous, for nodes along a commuters route
47For the proof of Theorem 1, we have assumed that volume is strictly increasing in
density, so initial conditions can be phrased in terms of either.
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that are not the point of origin. So we employ a xed point on this data; it
will be in a subspace of functions of bounded variation.
We have already dened the space where  lives; see (6). Notice that for
Theorem 1, ux mn is one to one. Recalling that each permissible route can
go through a given node at most once (see Assumption 2), next we dene the
space of all possible boundary conditions, G:
Denitions: Let mn be the Lipschitz constant for mn and let  
maxm;n mn. Fix z, 0 < z 
1

. For g : [0; t] ! R+, the total variation
norm is dened as:
TV (g)  sup
(
KX
k=0
jg(tk)  g(tk 1)j
K  1, tk 2 [0; t], t0 < t1 <    < tK
)
Next, dene the lower bound on departure density di¤erent from zero:
g  min
(
 1mn
 
(fc 2 C j R(c)) = r,
 d(c)    < g)
2
!m;n = 1; 2; :::; N ;
r 2 R;  2 [0; t]; 1(R(c)) = m;2(R(c)) = n; (fc 2 C j R(c)) = r;
 d(c)    < g) > 0 
> 0
Number the equivalence classes of links dened by the relation , from the
bottom class up, using the index h = 1; 2; :::; H  N2   N . Dene 1 
(T= + 1)  f and dene inductively
h+1  2  jRj  (T= + 1)  f +
f  2  
z
+ h 

2  2 +
N      


(11)
where   max
m;n
mn
 
f

and   min
m;n
mn
 
g

for h = 1; 2; :::; H   1. For link mn, dene h(mn) as the equivalence class to
which it is assigned. Dene:
Grm 
8>>><>>>:

 1mn

(fc2CjR(c)=r, jd(c) j<g)
2

if 1(r) = m, 2(r) = n;n
grm() measurable on [0; t] j 0  g
r
m()  f , g
r
m(t) = 0, TV (g
r
m())  
r
h(mn)
o
if i(r) = m, i+1(r) = n for some i > 1
Finally, dene:
G 
NY
n=1
Y
fr2Rji(r)=n for some ig
Grn
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We shall be searching for a xed point in G. So the next step is to dene
the map from G into itself.
We begin by xing some g 2 G. For reasons explained in the text below
equation (5), we alter it by inserting a small gap of size & > 0 after every
downward jump, namely where grm(
 ) > grm(
+) To keep notation from
getting out of hand, we will index g by & only at the end when we let & ! 0.48
The 2 in (11) accounts for the insertion of these gaps.
Denitions: For each link mn, m 6= n, we dene
g(m;n; ) 
X
fr2Rji(r)=m, i+1(r)=n for some i1g
grn()
To simplify notation, dene
mn  h(mn)
Notice that TV (g(m;n; ))  mn. After some preparation, we shall dene
the map T : G ! G. We will call T (g)  bg. Next we begin preparations for
dening this map.
Given the initial condition
bf(m;n; 0;) = 0 8   0
and the left boundary condition on each link mn, m 6= n: bf(m;n;  ; 0) =
g(m;n; ), Strub and Bayen (2006) yields existence of a unique solution (as we
have dened it) called bf(m;n;  ;) of bounded variation on (0; t)(0; (m;n)).
We must be a little careful here, specically at the right boundary (m;n).
Although they only use the solution on (0; t) (0; (m;n)), as they remark, it
is in fact dened on [0; t]  [0; (m;n)]. All we need is that it is dened on
(0; t) (0; (m;n)]. Next, to make the right boundary condition non-binding,
we simply set (in their notation) b(t) = 0. Then the right boundary condition
becomes vacuous.49 The initial (in contrast with the boundary) condition is:
at time 0, the density of tra¢c along the link is 0. Only the left boundary
condition will apply in a signicant way.
48As detailed in the main text, one might prefer the use of the classical solution to the
conservation law when there are no gaps inserted. In this case, less dense tra¢c does not
separate itself from denser tra¢c that follows. Then we can set & = 0.
49In fact, this is where we use Assumption 3 (or the stronger version in the statement of
Theorem 1), implying that tra¢c congestion does not backup onto a link at the endpoint of
that link. In particular, we ignore behavior outside the link when we solve the conservation
law for tra¢c on a link.
49
Next we dene a unique mn(b ; ) 2 Dmn associated with bf . To accomplish
this, we shall apply Biles et al (2014) Theorem 1 to the (discontinuous) ordinary
di¤erential equation:50
@mn(b ; )
@
= 
 bf(m;n;  ; mn(b ; )); xmn (12)
This will require us to delve a little into the clever proof of existence of a
solution bf used by Strub and Bayen (2006)51 in order to integrate it with the
structure of Biles et al (2014).52 These ideas will also be useful shortly in
order to prove that bg 2 G.
We know from Strub and Bayen (2006), p. 560, that for each 2 [0; (m;n)],bf(m;n; ;) is of bounded variation. But for our purposes, it will be useful
to prove the stronger assertion: For each  2 [0; (m;n)],
TV ( bf(m;n; ;))  mn:
That is next on the agenda.53
Strub and Bayen (2006) use an approximation, generally called the Go-
dunov approximation, to construct the solution that we call bf(m;n; ; ). In
their notation, they consider only one link and thus drop m and n. To reduce
notation, we also drop these indexes temporarily. The discrete approximation
they use is called si , where s denotes a time cell and i denotes a location cell,
and where i and s are integers. Specically, the cells are dened as follows:
Ii =


M


i 
1
2

;

M


i+
1
2

Js =


M
z 

s 
1
2

;

M
z 

s+
1
2

50Our rst attempts, before nding Biles et al (2014), tried to apply Bressan (1988,
Theorem 1). It is of some interest to see why the latter result cannot be applied. For
that Theorem, the natural upper bound on speed is the limit on speed as density tends
to zero. But then, given a simple discontinuity in bf , where bf is for example piecewise
constant, we can leapfrog back and forth over the discontinuity using changes in both time
and distance. This creates, in the terminology of Bressan (1988), unbounded variation in
the cone  M . Thus, the result cannot be applied, since bounded variation in the cone  M
is a key assumption of the Theorem.
51The keys to this proof are the Godunov construction and the Courant-Friedrichs-Lewy
(CFL) condition.
52Since there are notational conicts between the two papers as well as with our notation,
integration requires some notational changes.
53A method for proving this, di¤erent from the one we use, would directly employ the fact
that bf(m;n; ;) is of bounded variation for each  2 [0; (m;n)], with possibly di¤erent
bounds across ; then show that there is a uniform bound.
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where  is the length of the link, M denotes the number of location cells
(i = 1; 2; :::;M), s indexes time cells (s = 1; 2; :::;K) where K is the smallest
integer strictly larger than tM
z
, and z > 0 is an arbitrary constant. The cell
sizes tend to zero (M!1) as the approximation converges. It is important
to note that, from the uniqueness result of Strub and Bayen (2006), the limit
is actually independent of choice of z.
The boundary condition is given by:
0i =
M
z

Z
Js
g(m;n; )d
The next issue, both di¢cult and important, is to show that TV ( bf(m;n; ;)) 
mn. This is important because we must show that the exit density from a
link (as a function of time) has a uniform bound on variation so that we have
compactness and we can apply a xed point theorem. It is a stronger require-
ment than simply showing that the exit density has bounded variation for each
given g. The reason this issue is di¢cult is due to the Godunov scheme. As
Friedrich et al (2018, p. 8) note, In particular, the Godunov type scheme also
does not t into the classical assumptions of total variation diminishing (TVD)
schemes, as the total variation may slightly increase (as it is the same for the
analytical solution). Although we wish we could directly apply their results
on bounded variation in section 3.3 of their paper, we cannot. Our framework
is simpler (as we use local ux),54 but the big hazard with the mathematics
literature on conservation laws that also applies here is that they address the
initial value problem rather than the boundary value problem. So we must
alter their clever argument substantially.
To begin, the key equation system from Strub and Bayen (2006, p. 559) is
as follows:558<: 
s
i+ 1
2
is an element f of I(si ; 
s
i+1) such that sign(
s
i+1   
s
i )  (f) is minimal
s+1i = 
s
i   z 

(s
i+ 1
2
)  (s
i  1
2
)

(13)
Then noting that in our particular tra¢c context, s
i+ 1
2
= si and 
s
i  1
2
= si 1,
and employing (13),
s+1i+1   
s
i+1 = 
s
i+1   z 
 
(si+1)  (
s
i )

  s 1i+1 + z 
 
(s 1i+1 )  (
s 1
i )

= z 

(si )  (
s 1
i )

+

si+1   
s 1
i+1

+ z 

(s 1i+1 )  (
s
i+1)

(14)
54It is easy to see how our work can be generalized to non-local ux, in the spirit of
Friedrich et al (2018).
55The denition of I can be found in (8).
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Now consider two cases: si+1  
s 1
i+1 and 
s
i+1 < 
s 1
i+1 . In the rst case,
using (14),
s+1i+1   
s
i+1 = z 

(si )  (
s 1
i )

+

si+1   
s 1
i+1

+ z 

(s 1i+1 )  (
s
i+1)

= z 

(si )  (
s 1
i )

+
si+1   s 1i+1   z  (si+1)  (s 1i+1 )
Taking absolute values and using the fact that
si+1   s 1i+1  z(si+1)  (s 1i+1 ) 
0,s+1i+1   si+1  z  (si )  (s 1i )+ si+1   s 1i+1   z  (si+1)  (s 1i+1 )
In the second case, multiplying both sides of (14) by  1,
si+1   
s+1
i+1 = z 

(s 1i )  (
s
i )

+

s 1i+1   
s
i+1

+ z 

(si+1)  (
s 1
i+1 )

= z 

(s 1i )  (
s
i )

+

s 1i+1   
s
i+1

  z 

(s 1i+1 )  (
s
i+1)

Taking absolute values, in a similar fashion we obtain:si+1   s+1i+1   z  (s 1i )  (si )+ s 1i+1   si+1  z  (s 1i+1 )  (si+1)
Thus, the following holds in either case:s+1i+1   si+1  z  (s 1i )  (si )+ s 1i+1   si+1  z  (s 1i+1 )  (si+1)
Next, summing terms:
M 1X
s=1
K 1X
i=0
s+1i+1   si+1  z M 1X
s=1
K 1X
i=0
(si )  (s 1i )
+
M 1X
s=1
K 1X
i=0
si+1   s 1i+1   z M 1X
s=1
K 1X
i=0
(s 1i+1 )  (si+1)
Moving the second set of terms on the right hand side to the left and elimi-
nating common elements,
K 1X
i=0
Mi+1   M 1i+1  K 1X
i=0
1i+1   0i+1  z
 
M 1X
s=1
(s0)  (s 10 ) M 1X
s=1
(sK)  (s 1K )
!
Therefore,
z
M 1X
s=1
(sK)  (s 1K )+K 1X
i=0
Mi+1   M 1i+1   zM 1X
s=1
(s0)  (s 10 )+K 1X
i=0
1i+1   0i+1
Now if we have chosen t large enough so that all commuters have arrived at
their destinations (at the positive minimal speed) before that time, then for
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M su¢ciently large,
K 1X
i=0
Mi+1   M 1i+1  = 0. In addition, the only location for
which
1i+1   0i+1 > 0 is i = 0, and then it is bounded by f . Hence,
z 
M 1X
s=1
(sK)  (s 1K )  z M 1X
s=1
(s0)  (s 10 )+ f
and therefore,
M 1X
s=1
(sK)  (s 1K )  M 1X
s=1
(s0)  (s 10 )+ fz
Applying the Lipschitz conditions,
1


M 1X
s=1
sK   s 1K   M 1X
s=1
(sK)  (s 1K )

M 1X
s=1
(s0)  (s 10 )+ fz
  
M 1X
s=1
s0   s 10 + fz
Summarizing,
M 1X
s=1
sK   s 1K      M 1X
s=1
s0   s 10 + f  z (15)
In fact, this inequality holds not just for location cell K, but for any location
 2 (0; (m;n)), by setting the limit of the various sums to the location cell
containing , called i(;M), rather than to K   1. Recall that the entry
density for this link is:
TV ( bf(m;n; ; 0))  mn
and thus
M 1X
s=1
s0   s 10   mn. Strub and Bayen (2008) show that a subse-
quence of , which is implicitly indexed byM, converges strongly (and thus
almost surely) in L1
 
(0; (m;n))
 
0; t

to the unique solution that is of
bounded variation. Since this is not pointwise convergence (and f(m;n)g 
0; t

is of measure 0 in [0; (m;n)]

0; t

), it is possible that
M 1X
s=1
sK   s 1K 
does not converge to TV
 bf(m;n; ; (m;n)). To obtain the exit density
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from this link, take a sequence fkg
1
n=1 with k < (m;n) and limn!1k =
(m;n), and for each k construct the sequence
n
si(k;M)
o1
s=1
. Then using
(15),
M 1X
s=1
si(k;M)   s 1i(k;M) is (uniformly) bounded. Applying Hellys the-
orem, for each xed k construct the function ef(m;n; ;k) as a pointwise limit
of a subsequence of
n
si(k;M)
o1
s=1
asM! 1. Then apply Hellys theorem
again to obtain the pointwise limit of a subsequence of ef(m;n; ;k) as k !1,
and call this density bf(m;n; ; (m;n)). This exit density (as a function of
time) will form the basis for entry density on succeeding links. Notice that
TV ( bf(m;n; ; (m;n)))      mn + f  z . (16)
By remark 2.1 of Bressan (2000), we can take it to be right continuous in t.
Next, we examine whether this exit density is unique, at least among func-
tions of bounded variation that satisfy TV (f(m;n; ;))      mn +
f 
z
.
Suppose that there are two di¤erent exit limits of bounded variation; call themef(m;n; ; (m;n)) and bf(m;n; ; (m;n)). Now we already know from Strub
and Bayen (2006) that ef(m;n; ; ) = bf(m;n; ; ) a.s. (t;). The next ar-
gument parallels Strub and Bayen (pp. 558-559) where they argue that their
solution is unique. We know for ' 2 C1c (0; t) and  2 C
1
c (0; (m;n)) (where
';   0),Z (m;n)
0
Z t
0
 ef(m;n; t;)  bf(m;n; t;) ()'0(t)+ (17)
sign
 ef(m;n; t;)  bf(m;n; t;)   ef(m;n; t;)   bf(m;n; t;)   0()'(t)ddt
 0
For ' approximating the indicator function of [0; t], we have:
lim sup
t!0
Z (m;n)
0
 ef(m;n; t;)  bf(m;n; t;) ()d
  lim inf
t!t
Z (m;n)
0
 ef(m;n; t;)  bf(m;n; t;) ()d
  
Z (m;n)
0
Z t
0
sign
 ef(m;n; t;)  bf(m;n; t;) 

 ef(m;n; t;)   bf(m;n; t;)   0()ddt
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Taking  to approximate the indicator function of [0; (m;n)],
 lim sup
!(m;n)
Z t
0
sign
 ef(m;n; t;)  bf(m;n; t;) 

 ef(m;n; t;)   bf(m;n; t;) dt
  lim inf
!0
Z t
0
sign
 ef(m;n; t;)  bf(m;n; t;) 

 ef(m;n; t;)   bf(m;n; t;) dt
In sum, we have:
lim sup
t!0
Z (m;n)
0
 ef(m;n; t;)  bf(m;n; t;) d
  lim inf
t!t
Z (m;n)
0
 ef(m;n; t;)  bf(m;n; t;) d
 lim sup
!(m;n)
Z t
0
sign
 ef(m;n; t;)  bf(m;n; t;) 

 ef(m;n; t;)   bf(m;n; t;) dt
  lim inf
!0
Z t
0
sign
 ef(m;n; t;)  bf(m;n; t;) 

 ef(m;n; t;)   bf(m;n; t;) dt
From the conditions on links at times 0 and t, the left hand side (the rst two
terms) are zero, we obtain:
lim inf
!0
Z t
0
sign
 ef(m;n; t;)  bf(m;n; t;) 

 ef(m;n; t;)   bf(m;n; t;) dt
 lim sup
!(m;n)
Z t
0
sign
 ef(m;n; t;)  bf(m;n; t;) 

 ef(m;n; t;)   bf(m;n; t;) dt
As in Strub and Bayen (2006, p. 558), the left hand side is 0. The right hand
side is non-negative (recall that ux  is increasing in density). Hence,
lim sup
!(m;n)
Z t
0
sign
 ef(m;n; t;)  bf(m;n; t;)   ef(m;n; t;)   bf(m;n; t;) dt
= 0
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Now since  is strictly increasing in f , we know that
lim sup
!(m;n)
 ef(m;n; ;)  bf(m;n; ;)
L1
= 0,
implying that ef(m;n; ; (m;n)) = bf(m;n; ; (m;n)) a.s. (t). Both ef(m;n; ; (m;n))
and bf(m;n; ; (m;n)) are of bounded variation, so by Lemma 2.1 and Remark
2.1 of Bressan (2000), by taking right continuous versions, they are in fact
equal.
Although we used the argument just above to obtain a well-dened exit
density, if we replace (m;n) with an arbitrary distance , 0 <  < (m;n),
the same argument applies and we have that for any sequence

k
	1
k=1
with
limk!1k = , limk!1 bf(m;n; ;k) = bf(m;n; ;) a.s. (t), where
TV ( bf(m;n; ;))      mn + f  z .
Taking the right continuous version, it follows that limk!1 bf(m;n; ;k) =bf(m;n; ;) pointwise.
The next step in our analysis is to examine existence and uniqueness of
Carathéodory solutions to (12), given that we have a unique solution to the
conservation law. Theorem 1 of Biles et al (2014) employs as one su¢cient
condition that the number of discontinuities in bf(m;n;  ; ) is countable for
each  . To prove this, we rst show that for each  , TV ( bf(m;n;  ; )) < 1.
We shall repeat some of the arguments above with the space domain in place
of the time domain.
From (13),
s+1i   
s+1
i 1 = 
s
i   
s
i 1   z 
 
(si )  (
s
i 1)

+ z 
 
(si 1)  (
s
i 2)

Again, we consider two cases: si  
s
i 1 and 
s
i < 
s
i 1. In the rst case,
s+1i   
s+1
i 1 =
si   si 1  z  (si )  (si 1)+ z   (si 1)  (si 2)
Taking absolute values and using the fact that 0 < z  1

, implying
si   si 1 
z 
(si )  (si 1)  0,s+1i   s+1i 1   si   si 1  z  (si )  (si 1)+ z  (si 1)  (si 2)
In the second case, si < 
s
i 1, and
s+1i   
s+1
i 1 = 
s
i   
s
i 1   z 
 
(si )  (
s
i 1)

+ z 
 
(si 1)  (
s
i 2)

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Taking absolute values,s+1i   s+1i 1   si   si 1  z  (si )  (si 1)+ z  (si 1)  (si 2)
In either case,s+1i   s+1i 1   si   si 1  z  (si )  (si 1)+ z  (si 1)  (si 2)
Next, xM0 integer, 1 M0M. Summing terms:
M0 1X
s=0
K 1X
i=1
s+1i   s+1i 1   M0 1X
s=0
K 1X
i=1
si   si 1  z M0 1X
s=0
K 1X
i=1
(si )  (si 1)
+z 
M0 1X
s=0
K 1X
i=1
(si 1)  (si 2)
Moving the rst set of terms on the right hand side to the left and eliminating
common elements,
K 1X
i=1
M0i   M0i 1  K 1X
i=1
0i   0i 1   z M0 1X
s=0
(sK 1)  (sK 2)  0
Now
0i   0i 1 = 0 except for i = 1, and then it is bounded by f . Hence
TV ( bf(m;n;  ; )) < 1, and by Bressan (2000, Lemma 2.1), bf(m;n;  ; ) has
only countably many discontinuities.
With this fact in hand, Biles et al (2014) Theorem 1 and the discussion
following for the scalar case implies there exists a Carathéodory solution to
(12), and the set of all such solutions form a funnel. We take the minimum
(speed) of these, since we do not allow passing. Using the result in that paper,
it is unique.
Next, we apply the arguments elaborated above to dene, and discover
properties of, the map T : G ! G. Let bf(m;n; ; ) be the unique solution
to the conservation law on link mn with initial condition 0 and boundary
condition g(m;n; ).
Let mn(b ; ) be the corresponding (unique) solution to the di¤erential
equation (12). Dene:
bmn() =  1mn(; )((m;n)) (18)
Notice that since speed  > 0, mn(b ; ) is strictly decreasing in b , so bmn()
is well-dened.
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With this preparation, we can dene the image T (g) = bg, that will depend
on both g, through the solution on a link f as dened above, and , through
its inverse image b .
bgrn() 
8>>>><>>>>:
 1mn

mn(grm(bmn()))P
fr02Rjfor som e i i(r
0)=m, i+1(r
0)=ng mn(gr
0
m(bmn()))
 mn
 bf(m;n;  ; (m;n))
if 9 i  3 with i 1(r) = m, i(r) = n;
 1mn

(fc2CjR(c))=r, jd(c) j<g)
2

if 1(r) = m, 2(r) = n
(19)
The argument that bg 2 G is as follows.
First, for the case 1(r) = m, 2(r) = n, by denition
TV (bgrn()) = TV
 
 1mn
 
(fc 2 C j 1(R(c)) = n,
 d(c)    < g)
2
!!
 (T=+1)f
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In all other cases,
TV (bgrn()) = TV
 
 1mn
 
mn (g
r
m(bmn()))P
fr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ng
mn (gr
0
m(bmn()))
mn
 bf(m;n;  ; (m;n)) 
= sup
K1, tk2[0;t], t0<t1<<tK
(
KX
k=1
 1mn
 
mn (g
r
m(bmn(tk)))P
fr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ng
mn (gr
0
m(bmn(tk)))
mn
 bf(m;n; tk; (m;n)) 
  1mn
 
mn (g
r
m(bmn(tk 1)))P
fr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ng
mn (gr
0
m(bmn(tk 1)))
mn
 bf(m;n; tk 1; (m;n)) 
 sup
K1, tk2[0;t], t0<t1<<tK
(
KX
k=1

 mn (grm(bmn(tk)))Pfr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ngmn (gr0m(bmn(tk)))
mn
 bf(m;n; tk; (m;n))
 
mn (g
r
m(bmn(tk 1)))P
fr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ng
mn (gr
0
m(bmn(tk 1)))  mn
 bf(m;n; tk 1; (m;n))

)
 sup
K1, tk2[0;t], t0<t1<<tK

(
KX
k=1
mn (g
r
m(bmn(tk)))P
fr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ng
mn (gr
0
m(bmn(tk)))

mn  bf(m;n; tk; (m;n))  mn  bf(m;n; tk 1; (m;n)) 
+ sup
K1, tk2[0;t], t0<t1<<tK

(
KX
k=1
 mn (grm(bmn(tk)))Pfr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ngmn (gr0m(bmn(tk)))
 
mn (g
r
m(bmn(tk 1)))P
fr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ng
mn (gr
0
m(bmn(tk 1)))
  mn  bf(m;n; tk 1; (m;n))
)
 TV ( bf(m;n; ; (m;n)))
+ sup
K1, tk2[0;t], t0<t1<<tK

(
KX
k=1
 mn (grm(bmn(tk)))Pfr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ngmn (gr0m(bmn(tk)))

 
mn (g
r
m(bmn(tk 1)))P
fr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ng
mn (gr
0
m(bmn(tk 1)))

)
 mn
 
f

(20)
To simplify this expression further, we focus on the second term. For nota-
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tional brevity, dene:
 
1hP
fr02Rj9 i s.t. i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ng
mn (gr
0
m(bmn(tk)))i 
1hP
fr02Rj9 i s.t. i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ng
mn (gr
0
m(bmn(tk 1)))i
 mn (grm(bmn(tk)))Pfr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ngmn (gr0m(bmn(tk)))
 
mn (g
r
m(bmn(tk 1)))P
fr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ng
mn (gr
0
m(bmn(tk 1)))

=  

24 X
fr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ng
mn

gr
0
m(bmn(tk 1))
35  mn (grm(bmn(tk)))
 mn (g
r
m(bmn(tk 1))) 
24 X
fr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ng
mn

gr
0
m(bmn(tk))
35
  
0@24 X
fr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ng
mn

gr
0
m(bmn(tk 1))
35
 jmn (g
r
m(bmn(tk)))  mn (grm(bmn(tk 1)))j
+mn (g
r
m(bmn(tk 1))) 

24 X
fr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ng
mn

gr
0
m(bmn(tk 1))
35
 
24 X
fr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ng
mn

gr
0
m(bmn(tk))
35
1A

jmn (g
r
m(bmn(tk)))  mn (grm(bmn(tk 1)))jhP
fr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ng
mn (gr
0
m(bmn(tk)))i
+
1hP
fr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ng
mn (gr
0
m(bmn(tk)))i 
24 X
fr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ng
mn

gr
0
m(bmn(tk 1))
35
 
24 X
fr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ng
mn

gr
0
m(bmn(tk))
35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
1hP
fr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ng
mn (gr
0
m(bmn(tk)))i 
jmn (g
r
m(bmn(tk)))  mn (grm(bmn(tk 1)))j+
24 X
fr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ng
mn

gr
0
m(bmn(tk 1))
35
 
24 X
fr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ng
mn

gr
0
m(bmn(tk))
35
1A
Similarly,  mn (grm(bmn(tk)))Pfr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ngmn (gr0m(bmn(tk)))
 
mn (g
r
m(bmn(tk 1)))P
fr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ng
mn (gr
0
m(bmn(tk 1)))


1hP
fr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ng
mn (gr
0
m(bmn(tk 1)))i 
jmn (g
r
m(bmn(tk)))  mn (grm(bmn(tk 1)))j
+

24 X
fr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ng
mn

gr
0
m(bmn(tk 1))
35
 
24 X
fr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ng
mn

gr
0
m(bmn(tk))
35
1A
Hence,  mn (grm(bmn(tk)))Pfr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ngmn (gr0m(bmn(tk)))
 
mn (g
r
m(bmn(tk 1)))P
fr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ng
mn (gr
0
m(bmn(tk 1)))
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0@max
8<:
24 X
fr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ng
mn

gr
0
m(bmn(tk))
35 ;
24 X
fr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ng
mn

gr
0
m(bmn(tk 1))
359=;
1A 1

 mn (grm(bmn(tk 1)))  mn (grm(bmn(tk)))
+

24 X
fr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ng
mn

gr
0
m(bmn(tk))
35
 
24 X
fr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ng
mn

gr
0
m(bmn(tk 1))
35
1A (21)
The key point from the last inequality is that as long asX
fr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ng
mn

gr
0
m(bmn(tk)) > 0
or X
fr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ng
mn

gr
0
m(bmn(tk 1)) > 0;
then
max
8<:
24 X
fr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ng
mn

gr
0
m(bmn(tk))
35 ;
24 X
fr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ng
mn

gr
0
m(bmn(tk 1))
359=;  mn  g
If both are 0, then we can ignore this term in the calculations of TV (bgrn(bmn()))
and TV
P
fr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ng
mn
 
gr
0
m(bmn()), since the di¤er-
ence is 0, so this term in the calculation of TV is 0.
Therefore, from (20),
TV (bgrn())  TV (f(m;n; ; (m;n)))
+
 
f

sup
K1, tk2[0;t], t0<t1<<tK
(
KX
k=1
 mn (grm(bmn(tk)))Pfr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ngmn (gr0m(bmn(tk)))
 
mn (g
r
m(bmn(tk 1)))P
fr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ng
mn (gr
0
m(bmn(tk 1)))

)
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From (16) and (21),
 2  2  mn +
f  2  
z
+
 
f

sup
8<:
0@max
8<:
24 X
fr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ng
mn

gr
0
m(bmn(tk))
35 ;
24 X
fr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ng
mn

gr
0
m(bmn(tk 1))
359=;
1A 1 
 
KX
k=1
jmn (g
r
m(bmn(tk 1)))  mn (grm(bmn(tk)))j
+
KX
k=1

24 X
fr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ng
mn

gr
0
m(bmn(tk))
35
 
24 X
fr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ng
mn

gr
0
m(bmn(tk 1))
35
1A
 K  1, tk 2 [0; t], t0 < t1 <    < tK
)
 2  2  mn +
f  2  
z
+
    
 
f


 
g

24TV (grm(bmn())) + TV
0@ X
fr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ng
gr
0
m(bmn())
1A35
 2  2  mn +
f  2  
z
+
    
 
f


 
g

24TV (grm()) + TV
0@ X
fr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ng
gr
0
m()
1A35
To bound this expression, note that if 1(r) = m, TV (g
r
m())  (T= + 1) 
f = 1. More generally, if there is some i with i(r) = m, i+1(r) = n,
TV (grm())  mn and TV
P
fr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ng
gr
0
m()

 (N  
1)  mn. Hence by (11), for any r 2 R with i+2(r) = n
0, TV (bgrn())  h(nn0)
and bg 2 G.
The set G is obviously convex as a product of convex sets. Imposing the
L1 norm topology on each component Grn, Hellys theorem implies that G
r
n is
compact and hence G is compact as a product of compact sets. What remains
is to show that T is continuous. Here we use intensively its denition (19).
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Let fg()qg
1
q=1  G where limq!1 g()q = g(), and thus limq!1 g
r
n()q =
grn() for all r 2 R and n such that i(r) = n for some i. We must show
that limq!1 T (g()q) = T (g()). To prove this, we must examine each node
in each admissible route independently. So let us focus on node n (subscript)
in route r (superscript) for the calculations.
Let bf(m;n; ; )q be the (unique) solution to the boundary value problem
with boundary conditions given by
g(m;n; )q 
X
fr2Rji(r)=m, i+1(r)=n for some i1g
grn()q
Let bmn()q be the corresponding solution to (18). Next we show that in L1,bf(m;n; ; ) = limq!1 bf(m;n; ; )q exists and is a solution at boundary condi-
tions g(). The proof traces back through Strub and Bayens (2006) proof that
a solution exists, detailed above, and uses an interchange of limits as follows.
The boundary condition at each link mn for the Godunov approximation is
given by:
s0;q =
M
(m;n)  z
Z
Js
g(m;n; )qdt
s0 =
M
(m;n)  z
Z
Js
g(m;n; )dt
Evidently, s0;q ! 
s
0 by the dominated convergence theorem. All of the pieces
of the proof in Strub and Bayen (2006) rely on s0;q as well as equalities or
weak inequalities. So if they hold for every element of the sequence, they also
hold for the limit. Thus, bf(m;n; ; ) = limq!1 bf(m;n; ; )q exists and is the
(unique) solution at initial conditions g().56
Next, we check continuity of the sequence of solutions to the di¤erential
56An alternative proof uses the denition of a solution as given in section 2.2. The
sequence satises the denition, and what is to be shown is that the limit satises it. Since
there is convergence in norm, the tricky part is dealing with the exceptional sets of measure
zero.
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equation implied by the sequence of solutions to the conservation law.Z t
0
 1mn
 
mn (g
r
m(bmn()))P
fr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ng
mn (gr
0
m(bmn()))
!
mn
 bf(m;n;  ; (m;n)) 
  1mn
 
mn (g
r
m(bmn()q)q)P
fr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ng
mn (gr
0
m(bmn()q)q)
mn
 bf(m;n;  ; (m;n))q  d
 
Z t
0
 mn (grm(bmn()))Pfr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ngmn (gr0m(bmn()))  mn
 bf(m;n;  ; (m;n))
 
mn (g
r
m(bmn()q)q)P
fr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ng
mn (gr
0
m(bmn()q)q)  mn
 bf(m;n;  ; (m;n))q
 d
 
Z t
0
 mn (grm(bmn()))Pfr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ngmn (gr0m(bmn()))  mn
 bf(m;n;  ; (m;n))
 
mn (g
r
m(bmn()q)q)P
fr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ng
mn (gr
0
m(bmn()q)q)  mn
 bf(m;n;  ; (m;n))
+
 mn (grm(bmn()q)q)Pfr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ngmn (gr0m(bmn()q)q)  mn
 bf(m;n;  ; (m;n))
 
mn (g
r
m(bmn()q)q)P
fr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ng
mn (gr
0
m(bmn()q)q)  mn
 bf(m;n;  ; (m;n))q
 d
 
Z t
0
 mn (grm(bmn()))Pfr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ngmn (gr0m(bmn()))
 
mn (g
r
m(bmn()q)q)P
fr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ng
mn (gr
0
m(bmn()q)q)
  mn  f
+
mn  bf(m;n;  ; (m;n))  mn  bf(m;n;  ; (m;n))q d
= mn
 
f

 
Z t
0
 mn (grm(bmn()))Pfr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ngmn (gr0m(bmn())) (22)
 
mn (g
r
m(bmn()q)q)P
fr02Rjfor some i i(r0)=m, i+1(r0)=ng
mn (gr
0
m(bmn()q)q)
 d
+
Z t
0
mn  bf(m;n;  ; (m;n))  mn  bf(m;n;  ; (m;n))q d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We consider each of the two terms in (22) separately. For the rst term, note
that _ is bounded above by  (0; xmn) < 1, so dbmn()q=d and dbmn()=d
are both bounded away from 0 by 1= (0; xmn). Hence, sets of measure 0
in time  are mapped to sets of measure 0 in the images of bmn()q andbmn. Using Ascolis theorem and passing to a subsequence if necessary,bmn()q ! bmn() uniformly. For if not, then limq!1 bmn()q 6= bmn(),
and there are two solutions to the di¤erential equation (12), a contradic-
tion. Since limq!1 g
r
m()q = g
r
m() in L
1 norm, the convergence is a.s. Hence
grm(bmn()q)q ! grm(bmn()) a.s. By Lebesgues dominated convergence theo-
rem, the rst term converges to 0.
For the second term in (22), recall that bf(m;n; ; (m;n)) is dened uniquely.
Now suppose that limq!1 bf(m;n; ; (m;n))q 6= bf(m;n; ; (m;n)). Then by
Hellys theorem, we can nd a subsequence of ff(m;n; ; (m;n))qg
1
q=1 con-
verging to, say, ef(m;n; ; (m;n)) 6= bf(m;n; ; (m;n)), where convergence is
pointwise and ef(m;n; ; (m;n)) is of bounded variation. By a uniqueness ar-
gument given above, it must be that bf(m;n; ; (m;n)) is not the exit density
for a solution. From (17),
Z (m;n)
0
Z t
0
 ef(m;n; t;)  bf(m;n; t;) ()'0(t)
+sign
 ef(m;n; t;)  bf(m;n; t;)   ef(m;n; t;)   bf(m;n; t;)   0()'(t)ddt
 0
For ' approximating the indicator function of [0; t], we have:
lim sup
t!0
Z (m;n)
0
 ef(m;n; t;)  bf(m;n; t;) ()d
  lim inf
t!t
Z (m;n)
0
 ef(m;n; t;)  bf(m;n; t;) ()d
  
Z (m;n)
0
Z t
0
sign
 ef(m;n; t;)  bf(m;n; t;) 

 ef(m;n; t;)   bf(m;n; t;)   0()ddt
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Taking  to approximate the indicator function of [0; (m;n)],
 lim sup
!(m;n)
Z t
0
sign
 ef(m;n; t;)  bf(m;n; t;) 

 ef(m;n; t;)   bf(m;n; t;) dt
  lim inf
!0
Z t
0
sign
 ef(m;n; t;)  bf(m;n; t;) 

 ef(m;n; t;)   bf(m;n; t;) dt
In sum, we have:
lim sup
t!0
Z (m;n)
0
 ef(m;n; t;)  bf(m;n; t;) ()d 
lim inf
t!t
Z (m;n)
0
 ef(m;n; t;)  bf(m;n; t;) ()d
 lim sup
!(m;n)
Z t
0
sign
 ef(m;n; t;)  bf(m;n; t;) 

 ef(m;n; t;)   bf(m;n; t;) dt
  lim inf
!0
Z t
0
sign
 ef(m;n; t;)  bf(m;n; t;) 
 (f(m;n; t;))  
 bf(m;n; t;) dt
Since the left hand side (the rst two terms) are zero, we obtain:
lim inf
!0
Z t
0
sign
 ef(m;n; t;)  bf(m;n; t;) 

 ef(m;n; t;)   bf(m;n; t;) dt
 lim sup
!(m;n)
Z t
0
sign
 ef(m;n; t;)  bf(m;n; t;) 

 ef(m;n; t;)   bf(m;n; t;) dt
As in Strub and Bayen (2006, p. 558), the left hand side is 0. The right
hand side is non-negative (recall that ux  is strictly increasing in density).
Hence,
lim sup
!(m;n)
Z t
0
sign
 ef(m;n; t;)  bf(m;n; t;)   ef(m;n; t;)   bf(m;n; t;) dt
= 0
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Now since  is strictly increasing in f , then we know that
lim sup
!(m;n)
 ef(m;n; ;)  bf(m;n; ;)
L1
= 0,
implying that ef(m;n; ; (m;n)) = bf(m;n; ; (m;n)) a.s. (t). Both ef(m;n; ; (m;n))
and bf(m;n; ; (m;n)) are of bounded variation, so by Lemma 2.1 and Remark
2.1 of Bressan (2000), by taking right continuous versions, they are in fact
equal, a contradiction. Therefore, the second term in (22) converges to zero,
so the whole expression converges to zero, and we have continuity of T .
Next we let & ! 0. Existence of a limit solution (in terms of exit densities)
follows from Hellys theorem. Uniqueness follows from the fact that for each
& > 0 the Godunov approximation converges in L1 to a limit: The approxi-
mations di¤er only by L1 distance at most & mn on link mn. So if there are
two solutions with di¤erent Godunov approximation subsequences converging
in L1 to di¤erent limits with positive L1 distance between them, then choosing
& small enough, we obtain a contradiction.
Next, apply Schauders theorem to the space G with the L1 norm and the
mapping T . This yields existence of at least one xed point. To show that
it is unique, nd the earliest time at which the two solutions diverge. Observe
that for given boundary conditions, behavior within a link is well-dened. So
if two solutions exist and the earliest divergence between them occurs within
a link, we have a contradiction. Thus, the divergence must occur at a node.
Finding the earliest time at which such a divergence occurs, the boundary
conditions must be ill-dened, a contradiction.
5.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof: A mixed strategy is a measurable map y : C ! [0; 1]jRj(T= 1). We
use the notation yi to denote a vector component of y, so we impose the obvious
condition
PjRj(T= 1)
i=1 y
i(c) = 1 almost surely in c.
First, we can dene a strategy distribution as
R
C
y 
jRj(T= 1)Q
i=1
R
C
yi(c)d.
Second, we notice that the proof of Theorem 1 does not use the exact dynamic
commuting route structure, but rather the strategy distribution induced by
a dynamic route structure. In other words, the proof of Theorem 1 implies
that for any given strategy distribution, there exists a unique tra¢c pattern.
Information about which commuter plays each strategy is irrelevant.
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Third, we dene the utility of a commuter for a mixed strategy and any
strategy distribution. Fix c 2 C. The utility function u(c;  d; l; R) was given
in (10). For pure strategy i corresponding to l(c); R(c);  d(c), this is written asbui(c; R
C
y) = u(c;  d; l; R). We have argued that in the end the tra¢c pattern
depends only on the strategy distribution. For technical reasons, it is useful
here to dene ui(c;
R
C
y)   1 if 1(R(c)) 6= O(c) or l(c)(R(c)) 6= D(c);
utility was undened for this circumstance. Then for commuter c 2 C, we
can write the utility from the use of pure strategy i (a route and time of
departure) given an aggregate strategy prole
R
C
y, as bui(c; R
C
y) and bu(c; y) =
jRj(T= 1)Q
i=1
bui(c; R
C
y), where the dynamic route structure ( d; l; R) generates
the strategy distribution
R
C
y. For this to be well-dened, we are using the
fact that the utility will depend only on the strategy distribution generated by
the dynamic commuting route structure, and the fact that the dynamic route
structure can now be chosen arbitrarily subject to the strategy distribution
since we no longer stick to the requirement that the origin and destination
nodes are pre-specied. Finally, we can dene the utility of commuter c from
using mixed strategy y(c) by y(c)  bu(c; y).
It is clear from this set of denitions that our model satises two of the
assumptions of Schmeidler (1973), namely the measurability assumption (b)
and the fact that utility depends only on the strategy distribution, not on
individual strategies. Assumption (a), regarding the continuity of bu in its
second argument, remains to be veried.
We take a sequence of mixed strategies fyqg
1
q=1 such that limq!1 yq = y in
the L1 weak topology, and prove that for each c 2 C, limq!1 bu(c; yq) = bu(c; y).
Our hypothesis implies limq!1
R
C
yq =
R
C
y. Let g 2 G be the xed point
associated with the strategy prole y,57 and let gq 2 G be the xed point
associated with the strategy prole yq. Thus, we have an associated sequence
fg()qg
1
q=1  G where for each q, g()q = T (g()q). Since G is compact,
there is a converging subsequence. Now pass to any converging subsequence,
call it

g()qp
	1
p=1
 G, where limp!1 g()qp = bg(). By continuity of T ,bg() = T (bg()). Hence, bg = g, and limq!1 gq = g. We use an analogous
argument below for both density and progress along a link.
57Although y represents a mixed strategy, as we have noted, all that matters is the the
distribution over routes and departure times, so arrival times can be found uniquely for each
mixed strategy prole using Theorem 1.
69
Dene
Fmn 
nbf(m;n; ; ) measurable on [0; t] [0; (m;n)]
j 0  bf(m;n; ; )  f a.s., bf(m;n; 0;) = 0 8   0o
Then we can dene:
F 
NY
m;n=1, m6=n
Fmn
We denote a typical element of F by bf =  bf(m;n; ; )N
m;n=1, m6=n
.
Now for each q there exists a unique solution bfq 2 F associated with
boundary conditions gq. There is also a unique density bf 2 F associated with
g. Impose the weak* topology on the densities as a subset of L1. Applying the
Banach-Alaoglu theorem, there is a converging subsequence. Now pass to any
converging subsequence, call it
nbf()qpo1
p=1
 F , where limp!1 bf()qp = ef(),
and where convergence is pointwise a.s. in ( ;). As in the proof of Theorem
1, it must be that bf = ef a.s.(t) for each xed  and a.s.() for each xed t.
Now for each q there exists a unique solution q 2 D associated with ow bfq.
There is also a unique solution  2 D associated with bf . Impose the uniform
topology on the solutions as a subset of C0. Applying Ascolis theorem, there
is a converging subsequence. Now pass to any converging subsequence, call it
()qp
	1
p=1
 D, where limp!1 ()qp = b().
Next dene be(m;n;b ; )qp  bf(m;n;  ; mn(b ; )qp)qp . The function be fol-
lows a cohort that begins at b along link mn. Since density can only rise
along a link,
TV
 bf(m;n; ; mn(b ; )qp)qp  f
So applying Hellys theorem and passing to a further subsequence if necessary,
lim
q!1
be(m;n;b ; )qp = be(m;n;b ; ) (23)
where convergence is pointwise in  and TV (be(m;n; ;b))  f .
So for each p,
@mn(b ; )qp
@
= 
 
f(m;n;  ; (b ; )qp)qp ; xmn =   be(m;n;b ; )qp ; xmn
so
lim
p!1
@mn(b ; )qp
@
=  (be(m;n;b ; ); xmn) (24)
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Next suppose that limp!1
@(b ;)qp
@
6= @
b(b ;)
@
on a set of positive measure in
 . Hence, by the fundamental theorem of calculus and Lebesgues dominated
convergence theorem, there exists  0 such that
bmn(b ;  0) = 
0Z
0
@bmn(b ; )
@
d =
 0Z
0
lim
p!1
@mn(b ; )qp
@
d
= lim
p!1
 0Z
0
@mn(b ; )qp
@
d 6=
 0Z
0
@bmn(b ; )
@
d = bmn(b ;  0)
This is obviously a contradiction. So limp!1
@mn(b;)qp
@
= @
bmn(b ;)
@
a.s. In
fact, from (24), continuity of , and (23) we know convergence is pointwise in
 . Hence,
@bmn(b ; )
@
=  (be(m;n;b ; ); xmn)
From (6) we know that mn(b ;b) = bmn(b ;b) = 0, so by uniqueness of the
solution to (5), bmn() = mn().
Fix a route r of length ` and a departure time b . Dene
 mn(b)  min0    t j mn(b ; ) = (m;n)	
=  1mn((m;n))(b)
The function  mn(b) can be viewed as a relatively simple implicit function.
Since @
bmn(b ;)
@
 (f; xmn) > 0 and
@bmn(b;)
@b   (0; xmn) < 0, 

mn(b) is well-
dened, strictly increasing, and continuous.58 Now let  d and  d0 be origin
departure time choices for route r, and let  and  0 be associated perturbations,
where b =  d+  and b 0 =  d0+  0. Thus, arrival time at the nal destination
can be written as: b `   d +  0 =  (` 1);(`)  (` 2);(` 1)    (1);(2)   d +  0  .
Dene
r 
n b ` : [0; T ]! [0; t] measurable j b `   d +   b `   d0 +  0


max
m;n

(0; xmn)
(f; xmn)
` 1

 d +     d0    0)
By Ascolis theorem, r is a compact subset of C0.
For each q there is a unique ()q and thus a unique b ` ()q. There is
also a unique b ` () 2 r associated with (). So there is a converging
58This can either be proved directly or a non-C1 version of the implicit function theorem
can be used.
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subsequence associated with f()qg
1
q=1. Now take any converging subsequence
of
nb ` ()qo1
q=1
, call it
nb ` ()qpo1p=1. It has a limit: b 0` () 2 r. Suppose
that b 0` () 6= b ` (). Now since ()qp	1p=1 converges uniformly to (), for each
 d +  0 2 [0; T ], limp!1 b `   d +  0qp = b `   d +  0, so in fact b 0` () = b ` (),
a contradiction.
Apply Schmeidler (1973), theorems 1 and 2, there exists a Nash equilibrium
in pure strategies.
Finally, consider the case where  is non-decreasing (instead of strictly
increasing) in f , and as always (f)  (f)  f . Let b(f) = (f) + , where
 > 0 is small. Then since (f) is non-increasing in f , so is b(f). Moreover,b(f)  b(f)  f = ((f) + )  f = (f) +   f , so b(f) is strictly increasing
in f . Apply our results to the modied game using b(f) and b(f) to obtain
an equilibrium in pure strategies for each . As the number of strategies
is actually nite, we can nd an accumulation point of the strategy prole as
! 0. Using continuity of the payo¤s (as demonstrated above), by a standard
argument the accumulation point is an equilibrium prole for  = 0.
5.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof: Given an outward bound shrubbery network, the only possible route
choice is at the third to last node on a route. The strategy prole we propose
as a Pareto e¢cient Nash equilibrium is to distribute each type of commuter,
where type is dened as an origin-destination pair, uniformly across all depar-
ture times and across possible routes from that types origin to destination.
This creates equal volume. We choose the minimal density consistent with
this volume (since volume is continuous, such a density exists). Clearly this
is a Nash equilibrium, as all commuters of a given type have the same travel
time and thus receive the same utility. Now suppose that there is a strategy
prole that Pareto dominates the Nash equilibrium prole. Thus, it must be
that there is some departure time and route that has a higher than average
volume. Since volume (f) = f  (f), and (f) is strictly decreasing, for
this departure time, there is some type that has a higher than average density
(where the average is over departure times and routes for this type). The
commuters of this type with this departure time will have a longer commute
than at Nash equilibrium, contradicting that the alternative strategy prole
Pareto dominates the Nash equilibrium prole.
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